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INTRODUCTION

One cannot understand energy development in the United States
without understanding how federalism affects our legal and governmental systems' ability to resolve sectional conflicts related to the production
and consumption of energy resources. In order to use the legal mechanisms which are available to resolve those conflicts, one must have
knowledge of the respective jurisdictional powers of the national, state,
Indian, and local governments and knowledge of the rights of individuals
to affect energy matters.
Federal constitutional powers provide legal tools for Congress, the

Supreme Court, individuals, states, and groups of states to use in their
attempts to resolve energy policy disputes.

Congress can prescribe

through legislation and administration;' state governmental entities2 and
individuals with standing to sue3 can litigate; individual states can act to
protect resources and citizens; 4 and states can cooperate with the na1. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. . . vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
2. The Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies
between two or more States ..
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3. The Constitution's article III, section 2 "cases and controversies" limitation is viewed, arguably, as the constitutional mandate for a doctrine of standing. Standing of citizens to sue for a
claimed invasion of a constitutional right has been subject to the changing ideas of the Supreme
Court. Today, nontaxpayer suits require that the plaintiff have a "personal stake," consisting of a
"distinct and palpable injury" to the plaintiff and a" 'fairly traceable' causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). The causal connection requirement can be met by showing a "substantial
likelihood" that the relief requested will redress the claimed injury. See id. at 75, n.20.
4. The tenth amendment to the Constitution states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. In the early case of McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), however, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion set forth the intended
scope of federal powers. First, the federal government draws its authority directly from the people;
next, the necessary and proper clause allows Congress broad authority to implement the enumerated
powers, and state legislation, especially state taxation, is invalid if it interferes with the exercise of
federal powers. See id. at 403-05, 412-24, 436. Two early Supreme Court cases articulated the scope
of the respective federal and state powers to regulate commerce much as that scope is viewed by the
Court today. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the Court held a state navigation
grant, which was in conflict with a federal licensing statute, to be void under the supremacy clause.
Chief Justice Marshall, discussing the intended scope of the delegated power of commerce, deemed it
to be "restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one" and to extend to even
indirect commercial activity, which would implicitly limit the legislative power of the states. Id. at
240. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), the Court recognized
that the inherent police power of the states, which the Court had carved out in earlier decisions,
could be reasonably exercised by the states without violating the contract clause of the Constitution.
The Court held that a state's granting a charter to operate a service did not imply that the state
could not authorize a competitive service. Id. at 539, 540, 551-53. The case stands for the assertion
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tional government,5 other states, and their citizens.6
that state contract terms and legislative agreements must operate in favor of the public, with consideration for some restraint of congressional powers in relation to state activities.
5. See Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historicaland Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619 (1978). Early cooperation of the states developed as the
federal government, through the spending power of Congress, provided conditional appropriations
to encourage cooperation of the states in programs to promote the general welfare. The constitutional question of whether the use of the spending power within the general welfare phrase is appropriate has been largely resolved by the expansion of the scope of the power of Congress to regulate
directly through the commerce clause. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-10, at
247-50 (1978). See generally Helvering v. Davis, 201 U.S. 619 (1937) (Supreme Court ignored a
prior limitation on congressional spending power).
6. Article I, section 10 defines limits on intergovernmental relationships among the states.
The area is largely unlitigated. Clause 2 defines Congress' power to control the scope of the states'
taxation of imports and exports. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Clause 3, which states that "n]o
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power...," provides the basis for cooperative interstate compacts
among the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. But see Dixon, ConstitutionalBases for Regionalism: Centralization;Interstate Compacts; FederalRegional Taxation, 33 GEO. WASH L. REv. 47, 7678 (1964) (discussion of the effectiveness of interstate compacts). See also D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NUTSHELL §§ 15.04-15.06, at 395-403 (1974). Engdahl claims that interstate and federal-interstate compacts are important means by which state and
federal governments can respond to changing needs and problems which cross jurisdictional lines.
The use of the compact device, however, is hampered by the present status of compact law. Id. at
402-03. The federal statute concept is difficult to reconcile with the rule that consent to the compact
may be implied or given in advance by Congress. Id. at 398. In practice, interstate compacts can
take years to negotiate. Although compacts are binding and have the effects of federal law-in the
sense that construction of compact terms is a federal question for Supreme Court review-the regulatory agencies established under compacts are often inadequately funded and without enforcement
authority. For these reasons, the compact is not always viewed by the states as a practical means for
interstate cooperation. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE
COMPACTS 54-56 (1976); see also Lutz, Interstate Environmental Law: Federalism Bordering on
Neglect? 13 Sw. U.L. REv. 571, 645-50 (1983) (discussing the use of interstate compacts for the
interjurisdictional regulation of interstate pollution).
Basic issues of the law affecting these arrangements-whether agreements or compacts-still
are in doubt. For example, the proposition that an interstate arrangement becomes a federal statute
when sanctioned by Congress is contrary to several rules. Congressional consent is not congressional
legislation, yet the Court has recognized that the sanctioned compact invokes the supremacy clause
to override inconsistent state constitutional provisions. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341
U.S. 22, 33-34 (1951) (Reed, J., concurring). The federal statute concept is difficult to reconcile with
the rule that consent to the compact may be implied or given in advance by Congress. The concept
also subverts the federal enumerated powers doctrine, since compacts can deal with any matter of
state concern. In practice, interstate compacts can take years to negotiate. Compacts are binding
and have the effect of federal law in the sense that construction of compact terms is a federal question for Supreme Court review; however, the regulatory agencies established under compacts are
often inadequately funded and without enforcement authority. For these reasons, the compact is not
always viewed by the states as a practical means for interstate cooperation.
For the purpose of promoting comity and courtesy among the states, article IV, section 1 of the
Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Article IV, section 2, clause I provides that "[tihe Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id., § 2, cl. 1 Corporations are not "citizens" for the
purposes of this comity clause and, thus, are not afforded its protection.
Individual states may provide public financial incentives to private energy enterprises within the
controls of state constitutional debt restrictions and the public purpose doctrine derived from the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Skiffington, Constitutionality of State Eco-
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While these powers represent the classic values of federalism-liberty, diffusion of power, and efficiency in governing competing separate
entities-they are not always effective in resolving real world controversies. All energy development and consumption problems do not fall into
precise state and regional geographic boundaries. The geographic regions which are the basis of energy sectional conflict are not legal entities
with standing to sue in a governmental capacity. The politics surrounding energy policy issues may require governmental units to use informal
powers to coerce with authority and to be coerced. The geological, technological, and economic market risks of energy development create demands by the private sector for more independence and control over its
decisions than government and legal authorizations may provide. These
energy realities do not fit into neat categories of formal authority. Therefore, other structures for cooperative political relationships must be created for federalism to work.
This Article is limited to describing the constitutional framework
governing the rights and interests of governments and individuals in energy matters. It discusses commentators' critiques of the particular powers and limitations of jurisdictions and persons in handling energy issues
within a constitutional framework.
II.

GOVERNMENTAL POWERS OVER ENERGY PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION

A. Federal Powers
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will [control] each
other; at the same time that each will be [controlled] by itself.7
A basic doctrine of our Constitution is that the government of the
United States is one of delegated powers. The federal government has no
police power and Congress can only act within an enumerated power,
except with regard to foreign affairs. Powers neither expressly granted to
nomic Incentivesfor Energy Development, 2 J. ENERGY L. & PoL'Y 13 (1981) (discussing these state

and federal constitutional controls on state aid).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 325 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
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the federal government in the Constitution nor prohibited to the states
are reserved to the states or to the people.8 The authority of the federal

government to deal with energy problems is found primarily in four enumerated powers of Congress and in the Supreme Court's interpretation of

them. Within the requirements of the "necessary and proper" clause of
the Constitution,9 Congress can control the nation's energy resource development and consumption through the power to spend and tax, 10 the
power to regulate commerce,"' and, on occasion, through the war
power. 2 In addition, the property clause of article IV 3 gives Congress,

as proprietor and sovereign, exclusive jurisdiction over public domain
lands.
The boundaries of the enumerated powers of Congress and the congressional ancillary powers under the necessary and proper clause have

evolved to the extent that, today, federal legislation can effectuate uniform federal standards related to national governmental energy concerns
by command or by providing states and individuals with incentives to
cooperate. 4 The conditions and incentives for intergovernmental coop8. These federal-state power relationships are set forth in the two formal directives of the
Constitution, the supremacy clause and the tenth amendment. Article VI, clause 2 states: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. The necessary and proper clause, supported by Supreme
Court decisions, gives Congress power to deal with matters outside the federal enumerated concerns
insofar as those "extraneous" matters are used as a means or for the purpose of effecting federal
policy with respect to an enumerated federal concern or power. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 6,
§§ 2.01-3.09, at 11-65.
10. Article I, section 8, clause 1 states: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
... U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
General Welfare of the United States.
11. Article I, section 8, clause 3 states: "[The Congress shall have Power to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id., cl. 3.
12. Article I, section 8, clauses 10 through 16 state:
[The Congress shall have Power to] define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
;
the high seas ....
To declare War...
To raise and support Armies...
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia... ;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia. ...
Id., cls. 10-16.
13. Article IV, section 3, clause 2 states: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State." Id., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
14. See, eg., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1982);
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982); Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982); Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C.
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eration take a variety of forms in federal statutes. Two recent examples
include the Coal Leasing Amendments Act,15 which allows the states a
form of veto over coal leasing of certain federal lands within their bor-

ders, and the Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979 (EECA),' 6

which promotes a uniform national scheme for a federal emergency en-

ergy conservation plan. The EECA provides for state involvement in
energy planning related to local needs by authorizing federal, state, and
local governments to establish emergency conservation measures with re-

spect to motor fuel, as well as space and industrial heating supplies,
should they be in short supply. Applying its powers to regulate and pro-

tect interstate commerce, and to provide for national security, Congress
has enacted measures within the EECA which require the states to sub-

mit advance local emergency conservation plans, which will be used in
implementing a standby federal emergency energy conservation plan authorized by the President. Enforcement measures and fines are determined by the federal statute but left to the states to implement. States
may retain the enforcement fines.
The two Acts illustrate the congressional use of the necessary and
proper clause to promote extraneous ends related to the commerce and
war powers. No constitutional principle prohibits such regulation, even
when it falls within the traditional domain of the states. Judicial authority requires only that the extraneous matter being regulated by Congress

through the use of the necessary and proper clause have a "close and
substantial relation [to an enumerated concern] . . .
necessarily one of degree." 17

The question is

§§ 351-359 (1982); Minel Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 187, 193, 201, 203 (1982); Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-241; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1328 (1982); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1982); National
Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8286b (1982); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982).
15. Coal Leasing Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6261-6263, 6422, 8501-8541 (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 373, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1764, 1766-70 (discussion of the
purpose of the enactment). State cooperation in emergency conservation planning is provided for in
42 U.S.C. §§ 8512, 8513 (1982). A state must provide assurances that its plan can be implemented.
Upon approval of the state plan by the Secretary of Energy, the governor of the state and other
delegated state and local officers are authorized to administer and enforce the measures. The civil
penalties provided by the federal statute may be collected and retained by the state in agreement with
the Secretary to cover the costs of administration and enforcement of requirements of the Act. Id.
In addition, the Energy Emergency Preparedness Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6281, 6282 (1982),
which amends the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1982),
requires the President to prepare a comprehensive energy emergency response procedure pursuant to
the authority available under the existing law. The enactment came in response to the President's
veto of the Standby Petroleum Act of 1982.
17. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see also D. ENODAHL, supra
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1. The Spending Power
The constitutional power to spend is requisite to the power to tax
and provide for the common defense and general welfare. If the spending power is used to achieve a goal within the enumerated powers, and
Congress has acted constitutionally, a conflicting state regulation will be
preempted. The spending power is not limited to the enumerated powers, however, and can be used to provide for the general welfare as long
as the substantive provisions of a program do not violate a specified
check on federal power. Spending for the "general welfare," for all prac-

tical purposes, is a political, rather than a legal, issue. Generally, the
Supreme Court will not invalidate Congressional spending programs
merely because they invade state police powers and influence local

actions.
An important use of the spending power today is for the condition-

ing of grants on the grantee's compliance with federal requirements
which Congress is not otherwise empowered to impose. Congress can

subsidize any policy it chooses with such a grant, but the power to subsidize does not then permit federal regulation of that activity. Unless the
enactment reaches the extraneous matter through an enumerated power,
the granting condition does not preempt state law. State regulation of
the acceptance or fulfillment of a federal grant by a private person within

the state's jurisdiction cannot be superseded by federal policy. Unless the
note 6, § 2.02, at 16-22. The judicial department had applied the principle from early twentieth
century cases that the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to use broad discretion in the
means it chooses to effect federal policy for those concerns which the Constitution enumerates as
concerns of the federal government. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the
Court determined that "to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground." Id. at 423. The more
restrictive construction of the necessary and proper clause by the Court during the 1930's took two
forms: first, the necessity of the congressional extraneous regulation-the means-to-end-must be
proved to the Court's satisfaction, and second, the regulation of extraneous matters must have a
"direct effect" on the federal enumerated concerns of the Constitution to justify use of the necessary
and proper clause. The dissent of Justice Cardozo in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
reaffirms the early traditional view of McCulloch v. Maryland. Cardozo stated that "a great principle of constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement in an adjective. The underlying thought is merely this, that 'the law is not indifferent to considerations of degree.' . . . The
power is as broad as the need that evokes it." Id. at 327-28 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
Although the Supreme Court has determined that a sizeable role exists for the judiciary in
determining certain constitutional issues of equal protection and due process related to "legislative
facts," under the necessary and proper clause, the issues relating to "legislative facts" resolved by
Congress. D. ENGDAHL, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 21-22. A statute based on a legislative determination of fact may be subject to a later constitutional attack, however, on the basis that conditions
which have changed over time no longer support the earlier legislative means-to-end relationship.
See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 n.68 (1969).
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individual can obtain a waiver of the federal condition, he or she will
have to forego the grant because of contrary state regulation.
The spending power is important to energy development because energy projects, such as nuclear power research and development, construction of large-scale hydroelectric power facilities, and synthetic fuels
development have massive capital needs requiring federal assistance.
Federal funding programs aiding state and local energy-impacted areas
also have been enacted pursuant to the spending power in housing, environmental, and energy legislation."8
Much of the energy-related concern voiced by regional spokesmen
for the midwestern and northeastern states is based on the claim that
federal spending patterns and incentives, which should be related to na-

tional energy concerns, actually protect and stabilize certain forms of domestic energy production concentrated in a few areas of the country.
Cited as examples for that argument are the production incentives for oil
and gas in the southwest, federal investment in the production and marketing of cheap hydroelectric production through regional authorities in

all states except those in the midwest and northeast subregions of the
United States, and federal budgeting for nuclear research and develop-

ment rather than for other renewable resource alternatives.19
18. See, eg., Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1145-1147 (1982); Housing and Com.
munity Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8401 (1982); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43
U.S.C. § 1747 (1982). But see Myler, Mitigating Boom Town Effects of Energy Development: A
Survey, 2 . ENERGY L. & POL'Y 211 (1982). Myler examines the federal legislation and concludes
that the effect of the programs is limited since the specific conditions for the federal loans and grants
often require innovative plans, land acquisition, and site development--conditions which do not fit
the priority needs of boom towns and post-boom towns for basic services. For a discussion of state
problems of impact in terms of economic externalities, and the conflict and decisions which must be
dealt with by firms, citizens, and state institutions, see Russell, Regional Conflict and NationalPolicy, 70 REsouRcEs 11, 11-13 (July 1982).
19. See D. DEVAUL, BALANCE OR BIAs: BUILDING AN EQUITABLE ENERGY BUDGET 13, 17
Northeast-Midwest Institute (September 1982). DeVaul claims that by 1977, out of total energy
incentives valued at $217.4 billion, $101.3 billion-or 46.6%-had gone to petroleum industry incentives and subsidies. The policy bias could be reduced by several recommended measures:
1) repeal the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil companies,
2) repeal the expensing of intangible drilling costs,
3) repeal the cuts in the windfall profits tax on oil,
4) impose a national severance tax,
5) impose a windfall profits tax or excise tax on natural gas,
6) increase federal royalties for onshore oil, gas, and coal production and increase the amount
retained by the federal government,
7) increase the state role in setting energy production policy, and
8) broaden the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to include funding for urban energy resources.
See also Light, Drawing the Wagons into a Circle: Sectionalism and Energy Politics, 8 PUBLiUS 21
(1978); Light, Energy Policy:A New War Against the States, 3 S. REV. PUB. AD. 58 (June 1979). But
see Markusen & Fastrup, The Regional War for Federal Aid, 53 PUBLIC INTEREST 87 (1978).
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2.

The Interstate Commerce Power

A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which
import and export through other States from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the
trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be
found out, to load the articles of import and export, during the passage
through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers
of the latter, and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by
past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future
contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human
affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improba20
bly terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquility.
The congressional power to legislate with respect to interstate commerce is the single most important control Congress has over interstate
energy matters. A discussion of the scope of the interstate commerce
power of Congress is necessary for an understanding of the limits of congressional involvement in the regulation of energy resources-traditionally regulated by state law-and its demand that state agencies
implement federally sponsored energy policies. 2 ' The Supreme Court's
Markusen and Fastrup examine studies that analyze federal spending by region. They contend that
data for such studies too often incorporate federal budget elements whose geographic incidence, in
reality, is impossible to determine. Id. at 88. The authors conclude that since federal programs are
not designed to show a regional impact, citing the data by region does nothing to clarify the issues
and criteria for an equitable distribution of federal monies by region. See id. at 91, 99; see also
Goodman, FederalFundingFormulasand the 1980 Census, 29 PUB. POL'Y 179 (1981). Goodman
argues that the census-induced redistribution of federal funds at the local level, according to the 1980
census, will be far less than the proportionate redistribution of population which has occurred since
1970. Goodman contends that population change in many programs is a poor predictor of change in
federal funding due to the basic features in the funding systems of federal grant-in-aid programs.
These factors include (1) the use of intercensal data, (2) formula specification, (3) geographic specificity of formula allocations, and (4) non-formula determinants of formula based grants. See id. at
181, 187.
Similarily, in Johnston, The Allocation of FederalMoney in the United States: An Aggregate
Analysis by Correlation, 6 POL'Y & POL. 279 (1978), the author studies the results of an aggregate
analysis of four sets of variables which possibly influence patterns and change of allocations to states.
He concludes that these results indicate that political variables, such as which representatives and
senators are on relevant committees, are more important in determining the distribution of financial
benefits to constituents than need, the appropriations committee memberships, or the general political dispositions of congressional members. Id. at 297.
20. THE FEDERALIsT No. 42, at 262-63 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
21. See Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Fieldof Energy Resource Development: Some
QuestionsandSuggestions, 22 ARIz. L. Rnv. 785 (1980) (posing such questions as they related to the
the Priority Energy Project Act of 1980 (PEPA)); see also H.R. REP. No. 1119, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). PEPA was proposed for the purpose of creating efficiency in regulating the construction of
energy projects. The proposal was a response to the abandonment of a number of such projects
allegedly due to the statutory and regulatory guidelines administered by federal, state and local
agencies which created time delays and expenses which caused the projects to be uneconomical. See
125 CONG. REc. H9988 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979). According to Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio), its
decision to abandon the oil transport system designed to carry crude oil from the Alaska North
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modem approach to the commerce clause doctrine gives Congress such
broad power that its discussion seems perfunctory. The scope of the
power includes regulation of interstate commerce, the use and apportionment of lakes, rivers, and streams, and possible preemption of state and

local laws for commerce regulation and taxation. Regulation is not limited to commercial goods, but includes every kind of intercourse, however unrelated to business or trade.
Such interstate activity affects energy matters in a number of ways.
The congressional power ranges from authorizing water resource
projects on solely intrastate navigable waters, 2 2 to authorizing the President's allocation of petroleum to control national shortages and the dis-

tribution of the fuel and its products.2 3 Wholesale sales of natural gas
and electricity are also federally regulated within the scope of the clause.
If Congress desires to regulate pollution waste carried across state borders, it is empowered to do so by the commerce clause.24 Any enactment
of federal authorization and regulation of prospective interstate coal
Slope to the central and eastern portions of the lower 48 states was based on the changing economics
of the project. Sohio claimed that it spent five years and expended over $50 million to secure 700
state and local permits. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE REVIEW PROCESS FOR PRIORITY ENERGY PROJECTS SHOULD BE EXPE-

21-36 (1979). Others claim that over 600 of the permits were for local rights-of-way, not
regulatory overload. See 125 CONG. REC. 30,409 (1979) (statement of Rep. Moffett). See generally
DITED

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS, DEP'T OF ENERGY, REGIONAL ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND

ASSESSMENT (1979). The Office of Technology Impacts (OTI) project analyzed the impacts and
conflicts of planned energy development within the federal regional structure by states. Based on an
Energy Information Administration (EIA) Trendlong Mid Scenario for the Carter administration's
National Energy Plan, the analysis reported the energy resource lease, feasibility of its development,
and the institutional, geological, social and economic impediments to energy development for each
state and formed an aggregate regional summary. No aggregation of legal issues was made by the
national laboratories which performed the nationwide analyses. The Department of Energy (DOE)
project director for the Regional Issue Identification and Assessment (RIIA) states that nothing
similar has been undertaken by the Reagan administration. He viewed the American Bar Association study in 1982-1983 on energy sectionalism as being highly relevant since states do not generate
the requisite funds for maintaining the necessary standards for energy development and consumption, which they will be expected to assume as less federal energy legislation is enacted. Telephone
interview with D. Mathur, DOE/EIA (March 10, 1983).
22. For a discussion of the scope of the commerce clause power over intrastate waters, see
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,
174 U.S. 690 (1899). The navigation power extends to all streams that have been, could be and are
navigable, as well as to non-navigable streams which affect the capacity of navigable streams. See
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that
Congress has power under the commerce clause to prohibit discharges of pollutants into a nonnavigable tributary and does not have the burden of proof to establish that such discharges affect a
navigable river).
23. See Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (1982).
24. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and 1977, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). Some commentators feel that
Congress, if it chooses, has nearly plenary authority to control sources and activities that may cause
interstate pollution. See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Man-
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25
slurry pipelines will come within the commerce power.
The interstate pollution issues created by the pollution drift of upstream and upwind states are controlled, theoretically, by the provisions
of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA), which were
enacted under the commerce clause power. The Acts are viewed as a
means of remedy for interstate pollution not adequately regulated by
state control programs. Although the Acts require not only that states
adopt plans to maintain standards within their borders but also prohibit
emissions which would prevent attainment of these standards in another
state, their interstate provisions have given little guidance to date as to
how much interstate pollution is prohibited. 6
Commerce clause adjudication over time is said to reflect the changing concepts of federalism as well as the development of doctrines by the
Supreme Court to support the specific enumerated powers.2 7 Modem
commerce clause jurisprudence has developed from Court interpretations
in three areas: the congressional regulation of interstate activity, the neg-

dating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Lutz,
Interstate Environmental Law: Federalism Borderingon Neglect?, 13 Sw. U.L. REv. 571 (1983).
25. The Coal Pipeline Act of 1981 (H.R. 4230), authorized pipeline builders to invoke the right
of federal eminent domain to acquire rights-of-way. S. 1844 was introduced in 1982 with a similar
purpose. Both bills were reported out of committee, but no further action was taken in either chamber in the 97th Congress. In the 98th Congress, S. 1844 was reintroduced as S. 267, the Coal Distribution Act of 1983. H.R. 1010, the Coal Pipeline Act of 1983, was similar in purpose and was
defeated in the House in October, 1983. Backers of coal slurry pipelines claim that without federal
legislation, the process of battling individual groups for rights-of-way is too costly to make projects
economically feasible. See Tulsa World, Nov. 6, 1983, at G-1, col. 3.
26. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
TRANSPORTED AIR POLLUTANTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACIDIC DEPOSITION AND OZONE INTERIM

DRAFT (July, 1982). The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) draft critiques the reluctance of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assess the contributions of S02 emissions in one
state to S02 sulfate and acid rain problems in another state. The draft analyzes the avenues for
control of interstate pollution, especially long-range transport air pollutants (LRTAPs) under the
Clean Air Act, and provides that the statutory language of the existing interstate provisions precludes direct control of acidic deposition. The draft reports that states which export more pollution
than they import appear to have little incentive to enter into compacts. But see U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS TO THE YEAR 2000, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PLAN REQUIRED BY TITLE VIII OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ORGANIZA-

ACT 21 (July, 1981). The report points out that energy development and use are not
responsible for all pollution. The range of the relative contribution of energy pollutants to the
environment depends in a large part on what energy is developed and the level of wastes produced by
the production and consumption of those resources. Oil shale production wastes, for example, could
increase the energy sector pollution contribution, projected to the year 2000, from 58% to 89% for
all increases projected for various emissions. Id. at 19. Net air pollutant emissions for total suspended particulates (TSP), sulfur oxides (SOx), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) are expected to increase
in three federal standard regions-south central, mountain, and northwest-by the year 2000. See
id. at 6.

TION

27. See J. NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 139

(1983).
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ative impacts of state attempts to burden or regulate interstate com-

merce, and congressional approval of state actions which otherwise
violate the commerce clause.
a. Regulation of interstate commerce

If an activity affects commerce in even a trivial way, Congress has
the power to regulate in that area. The Supreme Court's interpretations
of the commerce power have resulted in the development, over time, of
doctrines which permit Congress to intrude upon intrastate activities in
two ways.28 First, Congress can control the interstate flow of products,
services, and people within the commerce power and the supremacy

clause, even if the action indirectly prohibits or regulates activities occurring solely within a single state.29 Second, within the meaning of the
28. The line between interstate and "the completely internal commerce of a state" has not
always been easy to draw. In fact, after Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824), although the
Court developed a theory of dual federal and state sovereignty for commerce, it reviewed the commerce clause infrequently until the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. Until 1937, the Court had held on only eight occasions that Congress had exceeded the limits of its commerce power. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court returned to Marshall's original premise under Gibbons that a broad
range of activities justifies congressional action related to interstate commerce, within the principle
that the necessary and proper clause power can be used to relate the congressional means chosen to
the purpose of the enumerated commerce power. Since 1937, the Court has held only once that
commerce power action by Congress is unauthorized. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
29. The modern commerce clause jurisprudence of federal and state regulation of electric and
natural gas utilities is illustrative of this development. The regulation of utilities is one of the important functions traditionally associated with state police power. Production and transmission of energy was an activity viewed early by the Court as likely to have a significant impact on broad
national interests. A series of cases early in the twentieth century created the doctrine that the retail
sale of natural gas was subject to state regulation, even if the gas came from another state or directly
from interstate lines, regardless of local distribution being made by either a transporting company or
an independent distributor. See, eg., Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 309 (1924);
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Landon,
249 U.S. 236, modified, 249 U.S. 590 (1919). However, beginning with Kansas Natural Gas Co., the
Court stated that the wholesale sale of gas in interstate commerce was not subject to state regulation,
even if some of the gas sold was produced in that state. The sale and delivery of gas transported
between states was also a part of interstate commerce. Once delivered to the distributing company,
interstate commerce ended, and the gas had only an indirect and incidental effect on interstate commerce. Kansas NaturalGas Co., 265 U.S. at 309. The Court later extended this wholesale/retail
"mechanical line" for the permissible and impermissible state regulation of natural gas to public
utilities. See Public Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). In Attleboro, the Court struck down the Rhode Island Commission's attempt to regulate the rates which a
Rhode Island utility could charge on the wholesale sale of electricity to a Massachusetts distributor.
The rationale for holding the state regulation impermissible was that, if Rhode Island could protect
its citizens' interest by an increase in the price paid by out-of-state citizens, then Massachusetts could
protect its citizens' economic interests by ordering the Rhode Island company to decrease its rate.
Id. at 90. The Court concluded such a conflict could be avoided only by holding that neither state
could control the price. The decision was presented in terms that the transaction imposed a "direct"
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commerce and necessary and proper clauses, Congress can directly regulate wholly intrastate commerce activity when the activity has a substan-

tial economic effect on interstate commerce or where federal regulation is
necessary to effectuate interstate commerce.30
rather than "indirect" burden on interstate commerce and was impermissible regardless of the state
purpose. Id. at 89.
Congress filled the gap left by the Court's interpretation by establishing federal regulation over
wholesale electricity and gas sales to local distributing companies. See, eg., Natural Gas Act of
1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1982); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1979, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432
(1982); Federal Power Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1982) (creating the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982).
In subsequent jurisdictional issues over wholesale sales for resale and direct sales for consumption, the Court has continued to hold, partly to avoid drawing the precise line between state and
federal powers through litigating particular cases, that Congress adopted the mechanical line of
Kansas Natural Gas and Attleboro as a statutory line to divide federal and state jurisdictions, and
provided the FPC, now FERC, with the power to control wholesale rates in interstate commerce for
resale. See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964) (Court
held that a California utility which received some of its power from out-of-state is subject to federal
regulation in its sales of electricity to a California municipality that resold the bulk of its power to
others). In Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972), the Court
indicated that federal regulation of intrastate power transmission also may be proper because of the
interstate nature of the generation and supply of electric power. Id. at 469. Later cases have dealt
with more direct federal regulation of electricity and natural gas sales. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). In FERC v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1979, which contained provisions to encourage adoption by the states of
certain retail regulatory practices for electricity and gas utilities as well as the development of
cogeneration and small power production facilities, was constitutional. The Court determined that
activity which was purely intrastate in nature may be regulated by the commerce power where the
activity, combined with like conduct by others in similar situations, affects commerce among the
states. Id. at 7. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 has been interpreted in a similar fashion by
federal district courts and the Supreme Court in relation to federal regulation which imposed wellhead price ceilings on wholly intrastate natural gas for the first time. See, eg., Oklahoma v. FERC,
661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981) (upholding congressional power to impose price controls and otherwise regulate wholly intrastate gas), cerL denied sub nom. Harvey v. FERC, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
In Pennzoil v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982), the federal
district court determined that the NGPA neither barred escalation of area rate clauses, which authorize increases in wellhead prices in existing producer-consumer interstate gas purchase contracts
to the maximum lawful wellhead ceiling price schedule authorized under title I of the NGPA, nor
required that area rate clauses must escalate prices to NGPA levels. Id. at 379. In Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the
NGPA did not prescribe prices for intrastate natural gas but set a maximum price ceiling for the
operation of contractual provisions. State legislation which prohibited activation of governmental
price escalator clauses to the federal ceilings in gas purchase contracts executed prior to April, 1977,
was subject to state law interpretation, but the federal Act did not trigger such clauses automatically.
Id. at 709.
30. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942), is considered the landmark case in modern commerce clause jurisprudence. The Wickard Court determined that in exercising the necessary and
proper clause, Congress may impose federal regulations on the whole class of all wheat grown for
on-farm consumption, not because some may reach interstate commerce, but because production by
this class of wheat growers affected federal policy with regard to wheat in interstate commerce. Id.
at 127-28. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), in
which the Court upheld a federal statute controlling surface mining and replacing state control over
the amount and conditions of such mining. The Court held that the tenth amendment does not limit
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The modem tests which the Supreme Court uses for permitting fed-

eral regulation of intrastate action in order to effectuate control of interstate commerce have developed since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel

Corp.3 The Court, in most part, defers to the express or implied findings
of Congress that the activity regulated has a "close and substantial," or
an "aggregate" or "cumulative" effect on interstate commerce and does

not review the congressional decision on economic relationships.

In-

stead, the Court tends to uphold legislative findings whenever they appear to rest upon some rational basis.
Commerce clause legislation does have some constraints. The legis-

lation cannot promote an end which is constitutionally forbidden, and it
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights to protect individual and state
interests. The Court will pay close attention to the legislative history and

statutory language of the enactment to meet its requirement that a rationally based legislative finding exists from which a substantial relationship of the statute to an enumerated federal concern can be inferred.
Legislation is not judicially interpreted to extend to all the activities Congress could affect under the commerce clause unless there is a clear legislative statement of congressional intent for the act to so apply. 2
In National League of Cities v. Usery,3 a the Court conceded that

minimum wage and maximum hour determinations were within the
scope of the federal commerce clause power, but held that the 1974

amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which extended
the regulations from private persons and businesses to state and munici-

pal employees, were invalid as an unconstitutional intrusion on state and
local sovereignty rights under the tenth amendment. The case is the first
congressional power to displace state regulation of private mining activities which affect interstate
commerce. Id. at 276-77.
31. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The case marks the Court's shift to the earlier principle that the necessary and proper clause is a broad discretionary authority of Congress to effectuate federal policy.
The need for the regulation and its directness to an enumerated concern need not be proven to the
Court's satisfaction.
32. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 5-8, at 243. The Court will invoke the "clear statement"
requirement when an extention of the full powers of the commerce clause would be inconsistent with
state institutional concerns. Id. Some commentators argue that it would be preferable, where the
relationship of a statute to interstate commerce is not readily apparent, for the Court to require
Congress to relate the law to its impact on interstate commerce and, in this way, assist Congress in
focusing its concerns on the proper issues. See, eg., Bogen, The Hunting ofthe Shark: An Inquiry
into the Limits of CongressionalPower Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187,
198 (1972). As stated in note 28, since 1937 the Court has held that the congressional regulation of
commerce is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the sovereignty of state and local governments only
once, in the case of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
33. Usery, 426 U.S. at 833.
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since the 1930's in which the Court has held that Congress cannot use an
enumerated power to regulate state and local government matters related
to the separate and independent functions and services which are integral
to state sovereignty.
b.

Negative implications

Over time, the Supreme Court has given the commerce clause an
additional meaning. Today, the clause contains an implied limitation on
the power of the states to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate
commerce. The restraint is not found in the commerce clause, but has
developed from a line of Supreme Court decisions which hold that when

Congress has remained silent in legislation affecting interstate commerce,
it intends that commerce be free and unregulated.34 In these cases, the
Court has interpreted the commerce clause to be self-executing in part, in
that certain state actions which affect interstate commerce are

prohibited.
34. These interpretations are referred to in treatise commentary as examples of the negative or
dormant aspects of the commerce clause. In these cases, several discrete factors have become significant in limiting state power. State regulations which aim at securing an economic advantage for the
enacting state at the expense of other states are void. Discriminatory state regulations which are less
favorable to interstate than intrastate commerce are also void. The incompatibility of different state
regulations may void the enactments. For a discussion of the origins of commerce clause restriction
of state power, see Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887); Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 281 (1875); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143, 150 (1851);
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 122, 283 (1848).
Local protectionism of energy and natural resources has been struck down by the Court as the
type of conduct that the commerce clause was designed to prohibit. In Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1922), the states
attempted to conserve natural resources by banning their export. In each case, the Court held that
behind the stated conservation goal was impermissible economic favoritism, motivated by the state's
desire to assure the availability of resources for local industry at the expense of other states. More
recently, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978), the Court reiterated the
self-executing aspect of the commerce clause, and held that, in the absence of authorizing federal
authority, the commerce clause does not give residents of one state the right to control the terms of
resource development and depletion in another state. Id. at 626. It also held that a state is without
power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped or sold in interstate commerce
on the grounds the articles are needed by people of the state to satisfy local demand. Id. at 627.
The area which remains unresolved in local protectionism statutes related to natural resources
is whether the express grounds of public interest in preserving natural resources and state ownership
of the resources remain as a valid argument for protectionism. A few older cases hold that states
may be selfish with certain resources such as water and game, but these holdings seem hard to
reconcile with the modem trend of the Court toward the national economic unity of the United
States. See, eg., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (upholding the New
Jersey statute prohibiting the export of fresh water of New Jersey into any other state); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding the statute prohibiting the taking of Connecticut
gamebirds out of Connecticut), overruled in part, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Neither case has been explicitly overruled on the point that an individual state has the authority to
control whether a resource shall be exploited.
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In a second series of cases, the Court began an approach requiring
the Court to look at the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation on the national interest in
commerce. 3 1 In this line of cases, the Court has used considerable re-

straint in determining whether intrastate regulation of state and local activities was in conflict with interstate commerce. While the Court now
uses various tests to distinguish permissible from impermissible state regulatory impacts on interstate commerce, no single test includes all the

factors which can be involved in a particular case.
In general, state regulation affecting interstate commerce will be upheld if, first, the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end

and, second, the regulatory burden imposed on interstate commerce, or
any discrimination against it, is outweighed by the state interest in enforcing the regulation. 36 The same approach is used for state taxation,

with special concern for whether the tax on interstate commerce is duplicated by other states.3 7 Commentators argue that the Supreme Court
35. See Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 506 (1942); see also
Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Public Comm'n, 457 U.S. 1130 (1983) (discussing the history of modern commerce clause jurisprudence relative to state regulation of natural gas and
electricity).
36. See, eg., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1950);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm
Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303
U.S. 177, 190 (1938). While the cited cases stand for the premise that conservation of resources is a
legitimate state end, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), summarizes the most recent
summary of the law in this area:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate
commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as
follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a
balancing approach in resolving these issues, . . . but more frequently it has spoken in
terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and burdens.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
37. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 6, §§ 11.09-.11, at 294-316. Applying the minimal commerce
clause limitations to state taxation regulation is no restraint on state taxation, since raising revenue
and using taxation to do so are legitimate end-means for the state. As a generalization, the Court
does balance state revenue interests against burdens on commerce. Since interstate problems have
both commerce and due process clause issues, the distinctions need to be made clear for sound
analysis. Using the negative implications of the commerce clause to characterize the issues, the
Court has created more flexible principles for limiting the application of state taxes. The resulting
limitations generally have proved favorable to interstate business concerns. Some commentators feel
the Court has had little real success in dealing with the problems inherent in interstate taxation and,
with the exception of due process issues, either comprehensive legislation or cooperative state agreements, such as the Multistate Tax Compact, provide better means of changing problems in this area.
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assumes a nonjudicial role which is properly a function of legislative policy-making when the Court determines that the state statute's effects on
interstate commerce require the balancing test to determine whether the
burden of the regulation will be tolerated or is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits.3 8 Arguably, since the balancing-of-interests test is made on a case-by-case basis, the decisions on state regulations
in these instances provide limited precedent for determining permissible
state regulation.
The constitutionality of state regulation and taxation of natural resources is tested by the aforementioned commerce clause standards.3 9
One commentator has observed that, where natural resources are concerned, the present Court is not balancing legitimate local interests
against interstate burdens, but is stopping after determining whether a
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end, unless the state
regulation or taxation of natural resources is discriminatory on its face
against out-of-state enterprises or citizens.'
Id. at 310; see also Stewart, The Legal Structureof InterstateResources Conflict, 1982 W. NAT. REs.
L. DIG. 6, 11-12.
38. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 9, § 11.08, at 291-92. Engdahl states several reasons for the
impropriety of the practice. First, the Court confuses the question of the burden with the legitimacy
of state ends. Second, it usurps the state legislative role. Finally, Congress, not the courts, is vested
with the national commerce clause power to prevent trade barriers and to promote national free
trade. The problem is compounded when the Court balances state revenue interests with both commerce clause and due process clause issues which become intermingled in judicial decisions rather
than being kept as discrete distinctions.
39. In general, any state's economic protectionist statute which is discriminatory on its face
against other states and persons is impermissible unless it survives a strict scrutiny test by the Court.
A statute denying access to state resources to out-of-state citizens is almost invalid per se. See
Tarlock, infra note 73, at 13; see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978);
Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a statute prohibiting
entry of out-of-state wastes is a burden on interstate commerce because it impedes movement of an
economic activity-the efficient disposal of wastes in commerce), cert. denied, Hartigan v. General
Elec. Co., 461 U.S. 913 (1983). But see Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1981). The Spellman court held that the state of Washington may limit
and prohibit the disposal of radioactive or toxic wastes within its borders. When a quarantine statute is discriminatory on its face, the court uses the standards for goods embargoes and applies these
to out-of-state waste. See Tarlock, infra note 73, at 13.
40. See Stewart, The LegalStructure ofInterstate Resource Conflict, W. NAT'L REv. DIG. 9, 11
(1982) (citing the decisions of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), and
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 U.S. 456 (1981), as examples of this practice). In
Commonwealth, the Court determined that the severance tax that Montana charged on coal extraction, which was 30% of the coal's value at the mine's mouth, was formally nondiscriminatory and,
with no further inquiry, sustained the tax against the challenge of interstate coal consumers. The
majority opinion emphasized the Court's inability to determine the ultimate incidence of tax measures on the policy question of how a state allocates the burden of taxation. In Clover Leaf, the Court
agreed that the Minnesota legislature might reasonably find that a ban on nonrecycleable plastic
milk containers produced out of state provided conservation and environmental benefits which outweighed any burdens on interstate commerce, despite the challenge that such a statute protected the
local paper container industry. Stewart concludes that the Court is not evaluating undue burden
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The Sporhase v. Nebraska4" decision is illustrative of the Supreme
Court's present approach when it does employ the balancing-of-interests

test. After initially determining that the groundwater of multistate aquifers is an article of commerce subject to congressional regulation,4" the
Court examined the Nebraska statute, which regulates the withdrawal of

groundwater in Nebraska and its transport for use in an adjoining state.
The Court held that the first three conditions in the Nebraska statute for
granting the permit-that withdrawal of groundwater be reasonable, not
contrary to conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise det-

rimental to the public welfare-did not, on their face, impermissibly burden interstate commerce.4 3 However, the Court then determined that
the statute's reciprocity requirement-that the permit would be granted
if the state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to
withdraw and transport water from that state to Nebraska-was a bar-

rier to commerce between Nebraska and its adjoining states. The Court
determined that Nebraska's burden to demonstrate the relationship between the reciprocity requirement and the statute's asserted purpose to
conserve and preserve groundwater did not survive the strict 44
scrutiny

which the Court reserves for facially discriminatory legislation.

because of three factors: first, the technical complexity of determining the economic consequences of
resource taxation; second, the regional character of interstate resource conflicts which presents distributional issues wherein a few states are dominant, thereby requiring the Court to constantly invalidate measures of one group of states for the benefit of consumers of another group of states, a task
better suited for resolution mechanisms other than adjudication; and third, the nonmarket value at
stake. Stewart contends that the impact of market and nonmarket values should be distinguished in
the litigation of state regulation of natural resource development. Nonmarket values which express
community and cultural attitudes and diversity about pristine environment and life styles related to
differing geography do not fit the free economic market principles which support the litigation testing the validity of state regulation of trade and industry. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs
and PrivateRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1236-45 (1982). Stewart also recommends that regulation which allows states and localities more freedom to limit resource development in accord with
nonmarket values should be encouraged. See generally Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The
Role of the Federal Courts, 6 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 241, 254 (1982).
41. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
42. Id. at 954. The Court further identified the interstate nature of the resource by stating that
states' interests in conserving and preserving scarce water resources in the arid western states clearly
have an interstate dimension. Id. at 953. The Court stated that the agricultural markets supplied by
irrigated farms are the archtypical example of commerce among the states for which the framers of
the Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation. The multistate character of the Ogallala
aquifer underlying the appellants tract of land, as well as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma
and Kansas, demonstrates that there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair
allocation of diminishing water resources. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a
federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal water projects nor the fact that Congress
has allowed state compacts to resolve state differences over water rights was seen by the Court as
persuasive evidence that Congress consented to unilateral imposition by states of unreasonable burdens of commerce. See id. at 953-54.
43. Id. at 955.
44. Id. at 958.
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c.

Congressionalassent to interstate burdens

When the Court determines the extent of permissible state regulation by relying on the negative implications of the commerce clause,
Congress has the power to change the effect of the decision with a subsequent enactment. For example, the import of the Court's decision in
Arizona v. California4 5 is that federal power over navigable streams and
nonnavigable tributaries can be exercised without regard to the structure
of state laws. Within this legal framework, navigable waters are available, for example, for the development of coal slurry pipelines. However,
the latest proposed coal slurry legislation appeared to contain assent for a
state's blocking water for coal slurry use.4 6
Congress can preempt judicial disapproval of state actions which affect interstate commerce by permitting the states to take action which
would otherwise violate the commerce clause.4 7 The authority may be
exercised by Congress' enacting a single statute which assents generally
to state regulation. An example of that type of enactment is the McCarran Act,4 8 in which Congress declared that there should be no barrier to
the regulation or taxation of the insurance business by the several states.
Congress may also require coordinated action between the federal government and the states. An example of this use of congressional commerce power was discussed earlier in relation to the Emergency Energy
Conservation Act of 1979, which provides for state planning and enforcement in relation to the federal statute on emergency energy conservation.
Without the conservation enactment, which authorizes states to impose
restraints and burdens on their energy supplies, a similar conservation
regulation enacted by a state within its police power would be invalid
under the commerce clause principle that such economic isolation or
45. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
46. See S. 267, Coal Distribution Act of 1983; see also Note, Do State Restrictionson Water Use
by Slurry Pipelines Violate the Commerce Clause?, 53 U. COLO. L. Rav. 655, 655-56 (1982).
47. This departure from national regulation of commerce by Congress developed from the decision in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). The Court reasoned that a subject matter which was
exclusively that of Congress because of constitutional directive is not within the jurisdiction of the
police power of the state unless placed there by congressional action. States are not disabled by the
Constitution from enactment, but by congressional policy to permit the use of a state's police power.
Id. at 108. Authorizing legislation and enforcement of previously unenforceable state regulation was
held constitutional in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). By the mid-1940's the Court had restated,
in a series of cases, that Congress had power within the exercise of the commerce clause to authorize
states to regulate interstate commerce in specific ways and impose burdens on it. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 420 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 315 (1945); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
48. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
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"balkanization" of resources from interstate commerce is legislation with
an illegitimate state end.
3. The War Power
The congressional war power is preemptive. The war power, both

executive and congressional, is considered a necessary authority for national security. It has been used to enact legislation in three energy
fields: control of oil policy, 49 generation of electric power, 50 and the de-

velopment of nuclear power.51 The basic issues in exercising the war

49. See eg., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding President Taft's
withdrawal of several million acres of public lands in 1904 as naval oil reserves to assure naval fuel
requirements), overruled, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Trade Agreements Act of 1933, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1982); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1862(b) (authorizing the supplementation of domestic oil supplies with oil imports to meet requirements of national security); Proclamation No. 3279, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,507 (1982), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (1982) (providing an import control program of petroleum and petroleum products to
the United States).
50. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). The Ashwander Court
upheld the construction of a dam and electric generation plant as necessary to national security
pursuant to the war power, even though the construction occurred during peacetime. The case is
also of interest because the Court upheld the congressional exercise of an enumerated federal power
for ends extraneous to an enumerated concern without the application or appropriate use of the
necessary and proper clause. By 1941, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court
finally recognized the condition set forth in dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 411-12 (1819), that a valid application of the necessary and proper power is required in order to
effectuate a federal policy preference which is extraneous to the enumerated concerns of Congress.
51. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970) (enacted
under the war power to provide for the peacetime use of the atomic energy which was developed to
create the nuclear bomb in World War II); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1970) (extended the use of the war, commerce and property powers to provide for
federal licensing and regulation of the development of nuclear electric generation by private industry). The 1954 Act made no mention of state authority to regulate the safety and radiation aspects of
nuclear power generation within a state. The only case which has tested the constitutionality of
congressional regulation of the nuclear field, Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C.
1958), affid, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960), held the Act a valid
exercise of the war power. Id. at 393. In 1959, the 1954 Act was amended to recognize state interests in the peaceful use of atomic energy and establish a program which gives states limited authority
over certain nuclear materials. 42 U.S.C. § 2021a-d (1982). Congress appears to have eliminated the
property power basis for regulation when it abandoned mandatory government ownership of particular nuclear material in the Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 21112114 (Supp. IV 1976).
The constitutional status of the states in the regulation of the use of nuclear power has always
been at issue. The 1959 enactment authorizes Congress to enter into agreements with the governor
of any state for the discontinuance of the authority of the Commission, now the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), over by-product, source and/or quantities of special nuclear materials to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for protection of the public health and safety of its
citizens from radiation hazards. The state standards for radiation hazards are to be coordinated
with the NRC, but radiation hazard is not defined by the statute. The statute and its amendments
reserve certain areas of regulation and licensing of waste disposal to the Commission. No federal
statute or regulation expressly preempts state laws concerning radioactive waste and transportation.
Courts' determinations of federal nuclear field preemption vary and are based on an implied rather
than an express preemption. The overall result has been that the federal statutes and regulations
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power is whether the matter is properly defined as a measure meriting
to preparing for,
use of the war power and whether it relates substantially
52
war.
preventing
or
concluding,
conducting,
4. The Property Clause of Article IV
The property clause of article IV 53 of the Constitution grants Conwhich regulate nuclear power appear to authorize a pervasive federal presence which preempts state
laws. See Mills & Woodson, Energy Policy: A Test for Federalism, 18 ARIz. L. Rav. 405, 416-17
(1977); see also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afd, 405
U.S. 1035 (1972). In Northern States, the Court provides a compilation of the federal treatment of
nuclear power to illustrate the unique attitude of the federal government toward its use. Id. at 114752. But see Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). In Pacific Gas & Electric,
the Supreme Court upheld the section of the California Public Resources Code which imposed a
moratorium on the certification of new power plants until the State Commission finds that there has
been developed a federal agency-approved technology or means for the permanent and terminal
disposal of high-level nuclear waste. The Court held that the state moratorium was not preempted
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and that Congress, in the 1954 Act and all of its revisions, had
preserved the traditional authority of the states over economic questions, such as the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use and ratemaking.
The Court determined that the section of the California statute was outside the federally occupied
field of nuclear safety regulation, and was not void as hindering commercial development of atomic
energy. In addition, the Court stated that the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished
"at all costs," and that Congress has given the states the authority to decide, as a matter of economics, whether a nuclear plant versus a fossil fuel plant should be built. The California statute was not
in conflict with federal regulation of nuclear waste disposal nor with the NRC decision to resume the
licensing of reactors. Despite the uncertainty surrounding the waste disposal problem and the recent
passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the Court stated that Congress did not appear to
intend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to decide for the states the question as to whether there now is
sufficient federal commitment to fuel storage and commercial nuclear high-level radioactive waste
disposal so that licensing of reactors may resume. The Court declared that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act may be interpreted as being directed toward solving the existing nuclear waste disposal
problem, without encouraging or requiring that future plant construction occur. Id. at 1730.
52. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 823-24. Fischer asserts that the war power clauses are constrained by the common sense notion that they are to be used for the limited purpose of waging war
rather than a congressional response to situations which affect national concerns in unfavorable
ways. Peacetime use of the power in nontraditional areas such as energy control should occur only
when other means cannot achieve the same goals. Even then, congressional use of the power should
be directed to specific military needs, such as a fuel oil stockpile for the military, and distinguished
from such purposes as encouraging development of domestic sources of energy. Id. at 828.
53. Article IV, section 3, clause 2 provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The power to acquire
property by war or negotiation has been tied to the powers to make war and treaties. The article IV
property clause is distinguished from article I, section 8, clause 17, which provides Congress with the
power:
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District. . . as may
: * . become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . ...
Id., art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. The "federal enclave" properties of the article I clause come within the article
IV clause as to disposal and regulation of ownership of that property, but the reverse is not true.
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gress the right to hold, dispose of, and regulate territory or other property of the United States, as well as granting exclusive jurisdiction over
the laws of federal public domain. Approximately 700 million acres of
federal land in the United States are in the public domain and fall within
the scope of the article IV property clause. The Sagebrush Rebellion in

the western states stems from the large federal holdings which comprised
a sizeable portion of the acreage of thirteen western states. Over 86% of

all federal public domain land is located in these states, 54 ranging from
7% of the Hawaii acreage to 86% of Nevada and 89% of Alaska acre-

age. The desire of these states to reclaim ownership and title to public
domain land within their borders is based, in a large part, on the mineral
and fossil fuel deposits which are under direct federal management.
The article IV property power does not specify the relationship of
the federal government with the state in which the land is located. Ac-

cording to judicial interpretation, Congress exercises the power of both
titleholder and legislature over the federal land."5 In Kleppe v. New MexThe article IV clause is broader and covers personal property as well as territories and federally
owned lands. The doctrinal variances of the two clauses are not discussed here, but it is important to
note that article I interpretations have rejected the traditional rule of extraterritoriality that gave
exclusive federal jurisdiction and legislative control over federal enclaves. The traditional article I
clause principle of "extraterritoriality" views federal enclave areas of federal land as literally excised
from state territory within whose borders they lie and as subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
This view has been modified by decisions which imply or express the view that states can reserve
degrees of jurisdiction over article I property upon cession of the state lands, and that upon federal
acquisition of article I property, state civil laws will continue in force over that property until
changed or abrogated by federal enactment. See, eg., James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S.
94 (1940); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
54. There are 1,045,831 square miles of federal public land in the thirteen western states, not
including federally acquired lands and trust lands under the Bureau of Indian Affairs jurisdiction.
The percent of state acreage which is public lands in the western states is as follows: Alaska, 89%;
Arizona, 43%; California, 44%; Colorado, 34%; Hawaii, 7%; Idaho, 62%; Montana, 27%; Nevada,
86%; New Mexico, 31%; Oregon, 50%; Utah, 62%; Washington, 26%; and Wyoming, 48%. See
generally G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUELIc LAND RESOURCES LAW (1981). See
also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ENERGY RESOURCES ON FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED LANDS

12-13 (1981).
55. The proprietorship of the federal government acting as landowner stems from the pervasive
federal policy in the nineteenth century of creating new states out of the territories, but retaining
federal title to land which the federal government subsequently disposed of to encourage westward
migration and settlement. See D. ENGDAHL, supranote 9, §§ 8.04-.10, at 169-90. Federally owned
property within the article I property clause became, by operation of law, subject to the general
governmental jurisdiction of the states. See, eg., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223
(1845); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836). The congressional power to
make rules and regulations for federal property, as stated in article IV, was construed as conferring
powers of control related to land ownership rather than powers of sovereignty or governmental
jurisdiction. The Court created a different rule for Indian reservations within territories from which
states were created. Where federal treaties with the Indians so provided, Indian country would
neither become part of a state nor be subject to state governmental jurisdiction. See Harkness v.
Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879). Additional broad federal powers over relations with the Indians existed
under the commerce clause and foreign affairs powers derived from the Constitution.
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ico,5 6

the Court attempted to clarify the relationship of the states and the
federal government as landowner. The issue was whether passage of a
congressional act to protect wild horses and burros living on public land
exceeded the power of Congress within the article IV property clause.
The Court rejected a narrow reading of the property clause, holding that
Congress exercises the power of both a proprietor and a legislature over
the federal land.5 7 The Court stated:
Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over
federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains
the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the
Property Clause. . . . And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily
overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy
58
Clause.
The scope of the congressional power to legislate remains open even
after Kleppe. Although the state retains criminal and civil jurisdiction
over federal land on state acreage, federal enactments for this land have
preemptive capability. Federal land statutes can be obscure. For example, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 9 provides that federal law provisions shall not conflict with state law, but the deference does not extend
to local ordinances in conflict with federal provisions. The extent to
which a use of federal land can impose burdens on the rights and privileges created by state and local government also is not clearly determined. This particular disparity affects legal issues such as water rights
when an energy facility is built on federal land. The use of the article IV
property power, distinct from the use of the commerce power, permits
the federal government to directly handle its own land, but the property
power does not prevent a state from concurrently acting within its sovereign powers. As a landowner in a state, the federal government is subject
to the legal constraints which the state imposes on typical landowners;
56. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).

57. Id. at 540.
58. Id. at 543 (citations omitted). Several commentators have observed the effects of this
broader reading of the property clause. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 826-27. Fischer notes the
effect of the expansive reading of the clause in Kleppe upon federal land management and state
sovereignty in relation to large-scale energy projects. He contends that after Kleppe, energy projects
on federal lands should be freer of state control and, from dicta inference, energy projects on state
land that affect federal interests on federal land may be subject to some degree of federal control.
But see Comment, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the PublicLands?, 1980 UTAH L.
REv. 505, which states that, should western states succeed in their Sagebrush Rebellion, as evidenced in statutes such as NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 321.596-.599 (1979) (declaring that Nevada has both
the legal and moral claim to the public land retained by the federal government within Nevada's
borders), the issues of federal land ownership are moot.
59. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982).
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however, the federal government, as a sovereign in its own right, is not
the typical state landowner.

5. The Supremacy Clause
[A]s the Constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it
might happen that a treaty or national law of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other Constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States at the
same time that it would have no effect in others.6
The supremacy clause of article VIII is the Constitution's direct
statement on federal-state power. Federal enactments relating to the fed-

eral powers enumerated in the Constitution have the capability of preempting state action with respect to the same matter. The capability also
exists as to federal enactments supported by the necessary and proper

clause for effectuating a federal policy preference in relation to an enumerated concern. Preemption can be created by an express congressional

prohibition or can be inferred from circumstances surrounding a congressional enactment which suggest an intent to preempt.6 2
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 284 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides: "This constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . ....
62. In the early case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824), the Court held that a
state law must always yield if it collides with a federal statute because of contradicting requirements.
The Court's view that the exercise of federal power was inherently exclusive of state power over the
same subject continued until the 1930's. A change in that doctrine occurred in Mintz v. Baldwin,
289 U.S. 346 (1933). The court held that a showing of congressional intent of exclusionary action
was required to accompany the regulation of a particular subject in order for preemption to occur.
Inferences of congressional intent are derived from legislative history, though not as a single source,
and statutory construction. Factors used to support preemptive intent include a comprehensive statutory scheme, statutory contemplation of national uniformity, a federal administrative entrustment
and the possibility of contradiction in rule making, federal and state enforcement measures which
raise the likelihood of double punishment. It should be noted that the Court has also used the same
factors to provide inferences of non-preemptive intent.
In a number of statements in recent cases, the Supreme Court has refused either to presume or
infer intent of Congress to preempt a field of regulation. See, eg., Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199,
202-03 (1952) ("If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly.
. * ' The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."), overruled, Lee v. Florida,
392 U.S. 378 (1968). In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the Court held that

no clear and manifest purpose of Congress existed to preempt the entire field of interstate waste
management or transportation either by express statutory command or by implicit legislative design.
Id. at 621 n.4. See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) (in holding
that a Maryland statute regulating retail gas marketing was neither preempted by the RobinsonPatman Act nor preempted by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Court stated that it "is generally
"). But see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S.
reluctant to infer preemption ..
136 (1980). In Bracker, the congressional power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian commerce clause and the semi-independent position of Indian tribes were found to exist as barriers to
state regulatory authority. Id. at 142. The Court asserted, in holding estate taxes invalid as applied
to harvesting of timber by non-Indians on an Indian reservation, that such instances require inquiry
to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal
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The mere existence of a federal statute, however, does not imply that
a preemption issue exists. Concurrent regulation to control a local condition despite extensive federal controls over the subject has been upheld
by the Supreme Court.6 3 Where Congress does not legislate, the Court
takes two views on states' power-either Congress intended to leave the
area unregulated or it chose to defer to state regulation in the area.
Preemption questions and cases are not found in simple situations.
Most of the litigation has arisen under the commerce clause. The consti-

tutional directive, of course, is to avoid conflicts of regulation among the
jurisdictions with authority over the subject. The Supreme Court's approach to preemption has become an application of the doctrine on a
case-by-case basis. Because the substantive or jurisdictional statutory
purpose is determined in such a particularized manner, few precedents
have been established. The Court appears to be influenced by the nature
of the state power which has been exercised. Also, preemption of a tradi-

tional state power is not favored if preemption is not clear on the face of
the federal statute.

In the area of energy management and development, federal preemption has been found where it is necessary to achieve the aims of the
federal legislation. This is especially true in areas such as the development of federal electric power, 64 reclamation, 65 and in areas, such as nuclear power,6 6 which are so unique that unified federal enactment is
law. Consistent with its holding in Warren Trading Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 68990 (1965), the Court determined that, although no federal statute barred state regulation, comprehensive regulation by Congress of the harvest and sale of tribal timber and the underlying policies of
that federal regulatory scheme were threatened by the state's imposition of taxes for the generalized
purpose of raising revenue. See id. at 151-52.
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-24, at 379-84. Contrary to its earlier stance that state law is
invalid in the face of federal regulation of a given subject, the Court now sanctions state regulation
that is concurrent with a federal enactment if the state law does not significantly impede accomplishing the purpose of the federal law. Tribe concludes that perhaps the Court has developed a new level
of judicial sensitivity to the fairness of schemes that delegate economic power over others. See, eg.,
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (upholding California's regulation of avocado marketability which excluded competition with Florida avocados marketed within
federal standards); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (upholding state regulation which
prohibits transportation not licensed by the ICC); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding a
California agricultural regulation valid when its effect was to eliminate competition in terms of sale
and price of the state raisin crop which comprised 90% of that consumed in the United States); see
also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (Detroit's regulation of
smoke emitted while a ship's boiler was being cleaned was contradictory to extensive federal licensing requirements of ships in interstate and foreign commerce, but was a legitimate end of state police
power).
64. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a-831dd (1982).
65. The Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-666 (1982).
66. The NRC and the courts have consistently held that states are permitted to regulate nuclear
power in areas such as economics and the environment. The area of preemption over state law has
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warranted. Federal energy-related statutes may mandate interstate federal standards and, at the same time, encourage state standards which

are more stringent. Such provisions are found in the statutes which set
67

the federal controls for pollution protection and water quality.

The supremacy clause is a major limitation on unilateral state efforts
to control environmental problems. Some commentators feel that federal
interstate environmental statutes are so comprehensive in nature that

unilateral state legislation in this area will survive federal preemption
only if the federal law provides for state implementation of the prescribed

federal program or if state or common law remedies are allowed by fedcentered primarily on the federal control over radiation hazards. Also preempted, however, are
other state regulations which directly conflict with NRC regulations. For example, a state cannot
require a plant to be built in a certain way for environmental reasons if the NRC requires construction in a certain way for safety reasons. See, e.g., New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey
Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976); see also Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afid, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). In Northern States, the court
determined that the federal government, under the preemption doctrine, has the sole authority to
regulate radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants; thus, state statutes which provide
more stringent regulation of radioactive emissions are preempted. The federal court determined that
congressional intent was "unmistakingly" manifested because of the absolute control of Congress in
licensing nuclear power for civilian use.
The dissent pointed out that the Supreme Court has consistently refused to find preemption
where state laws affecting health and safety are concerned, absent an express provision reflecting
congressional intent to preempt. Therefore, the fact that the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, contained no express provision that the federal government shall have sole authority over radiation
hpzard emissions was not the product of congressional oversight, but rather reflected congressional
willingness to permit more restrictive state regulation. Id. at 1155-57 (Van Oosterhout, J., dissent-

ing).
In Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903
(9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), the federal court determined that congressional intent
with regard to section 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act required the NRC to retain full regulatory
control over matters concerning radiation hazards, thus preempting only state regulation of radiation hazards associated with nuclear power. The state regulations for a moratorium on nuclear
power construction and a three-site requirement for proposed utility plants were held not to conflict
with federal regulation in the area reserved to the NRC, in that the statutes at issue were not aimed
at radiation hazards. In Pacific Gas and Electric, the Supreme Court upheld the California moratorium on nuclear power plant construction until the federal government discovered a method for
permanent high-level nuclear waste disposal which is both technically adequate and satisfactory to
the California resource agency.
67. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1982); see Clean Air Act, § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (allowing states to enact more
stringent emission standards); id. § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (allowing states to impose more stringent standards on new motor vehicle emissions). But see Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.
1981) (source state which revises its State Implementation Plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act
(CAA) is under no obligation to design SIP strategies to avoid interference with the more stringent
standards of neighboring states). The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides that each state may develop
and submit a procedure for enforcing the federal water quality standards under state law for new
source construction from which there may be discharge of pollutants. The EPA administrator may
authorize the state to apply and enforce performance standards if the state law requires standards at
least to the extent of the federal provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c).
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eral statute.6" One should remember that the federal common law decisions of the federal courts have the same preemptive capability as does
federal statutory law.6 9
B. State Powers
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal
Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, [negotiation],
and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will for
the most part be connected. The powers reserved to the several States
will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the inter68. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectiveson Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); Lutz, supra note 24, at 613. Under the CAA, states
are delegated the responsibility to implement stationary source emission control strategies to maintain or achieve national ambient air quality standards, and may include a program of facility-byfacility review of indirect sources of pollution, but these acts are not a condition of approval of the
state plan for air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410; see also Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982) (allowing states to develop state hazardous waste programs).
The CWA, like other transboundary water management statutes, transfers planning to state or regional agencies if governors of states in a water basin, or portion thereof, request that the EPA
administrator make grants of authority to such planning agencies for developing a comprehensive
water quality control plan. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(c). The federal government retains some type of supervisory or participatory function, but neither a state nor local government is given substantive powers. See generally Hillhouse, The Federal Law of Water Resource Development, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 844, 896 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Supreme Court unanimously held that
Illinois could bring a federal common law action against the city of Milwaukee and others for allegedly discharging raw sewage in Lake Michigan and creating a public nuisance for Illinois citizens.
In what is considered a landmark decision, the Court stated that new federal laws and regulations
may preempt the field of federal common law of nuisance over time, but until that occurs, federal
courts could appraise equities of suits alleging public nuisance by water pollution. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Court held that the federal common law remedy of
nuisance had been preempted by the administrative scheme established by Congress and rejected the
interpretation that the savings clause, which provided citizens a federal common law remedy in
citizen suits for interstate pollution, revoked other remedies. The CAA preserves common law remedies for enforcing emission standards and limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
69. See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973). The term "federal common law" is not analytically precise, but refers generally to federal rules of decision where the authority for a federal rule does not explicitly exist either
in federal statutory or constitutional form. In general, three categories of cases can be said to promote federal decision rules rather than promote the presumption that state law should govern. The
cases include matters in which (1) the idea of national uniformity calls for a federal solution, (2) the
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority is given to the courts, and (3) federal courts are
asked to exercise the judicial function of formulating remedies for the breach of duties imposed by
federal law. The latter depends on the presence of a federal interest and a displacement of the
presumption that state law should apply. In doubtful cases, the presumption of applying state law
may be resurrected where a supplemental doctrine is desired and where state interests are important.
See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, § 66, at 130-31, § 143, at 292-93 (3d ed. 1977); Comment, The FederalCommon Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
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70
nal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal Government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or [organization] of the former.7 1

1.

The Police Power

In contrast to the enumerated powers of the federal government, the
states have all the powers that any government can exercise in accordance with Anglo-American public law. The police power is the label at-

tached by the Supreme Court to the authority of states to legislate for the
purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens.7 2 Subject to commerce clause limitations, the
states' police powers permit them to control the exploitation, conservation, allocation and protection of their resources.7 3 An individual state
can decide whether a resource shall be exploited,74 what the rules for

exploitation will be, and what classes of individuals will have access to a
resource.7 5 A state can hold, manage, and dispose of property held in a

dual proprietary-sovereignty capacity, subject to the limitations of the
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 290 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
71. Id. at 288.
72. Chief Justice Marshall first employed the rubric "police power" to describe the rights of
sovereignty which states had not forfeited to the federal government. See Willson v. Blackbird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 105 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262, 269
(1827).
73. See generally Address by A. Dan Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty
and Federalism in the 1980's: Scaling America's Magic Mountain, Institute for Natural Resources
Law Teachers in Boulder, Colorado (May 25, 1983). Professor Tarlock discusses the constitutional
basis for state and national resource interests and defines particular state powers for regulation of
resources. See also Tanzman, Commerce Clause Limitationson State Regulation and Taxation of the
Energy Industry, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 277 (1982). Tanzman contends that because the crest of
federal energy regulation has subsided, state governments will act to replace some of these laws with
their own, and, in fact, are being encouraged by the present administration to do so. Tanzman states
that the nature and extent of restraints on state action, especially the commerce clause limitations,
will shape the state energy laws which will be enacted.
74. See, eg., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979); see also Tarlock, supra note 73, who contends that Geer is still good law on
whether a resource shall be exploited even after Hughes v. Oklahoma, which repudiated the legal
fiction of Geer that interstate commerce is not involved when state ownership theory applies.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335. In Hughes, the Court restated the principle that resources, in this instance
minnows seined or procured in the state, cannot be embargoed from interstate sale or transportation
by state regulation because of local demand or need by people of the state. State conservation of
natural resources must be accomplished in a nondiscriminatory way which recognizes national economic unity. See id. at 334, 336-39. But cf. Fischer, supranote 21, at n.158 (contending that Hughes
does not address the effect of the commerce clause on state-owned resources). By rejecting the
fiction of Geer as to state ownership of wild animals, Hughes is distinctly not a case involving stateowned resources.
75. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (holding that resource claimants to a
common pool are subject to state statutory correlative rights).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/1

28

Dodson: Jurisdictional Powers of Governments and Individual Rights in Ene

1985]

ENERGY REGULATION JURISDICTION

public trust doctrine;76 protect its citizens from interstate public nuisances;77 recover damages for injury to state-owned resources; 7 8 impose a
the use
quarantine and bar entry of dangerous substances; 79 and restrict
of state and local resources for ambient pollution disposal.80
76. The state has a duty to protect and maintain public lands held in trust. The use of public
trust lands for private use may be authorized by the state even without a finding that such a use is
beneficial to the public interest. The state may authorize a permit for private use of public trust
lands if the use will improve the public trust or will not substantially impair the remaining public
trust lands. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 486-88 (1970); see, eg., City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula
Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984). In
Venice PeninsulaProperties,the California Supreme Court held that the state holds a trust interest
on behalf of the public in tidelands and lands between high and low water in nontidal navigable
lakes. See 31 Cal. 3d at 291, 644 P.2d at 801, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 600. The established doctrine is that
title to such lands in the hands of private persons is usually subject to the rights of the public. See

Stone, PUBLIC RIGHTS IN WATER USES AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN LAND ADJACENT TO WATER, in
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 193-202 (R. Clark ed. 1967); see also City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 523, 606 P.2d 362, 363, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (1980); State of California v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 226, 625 P.2d 239, 250, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 705 (1981). Fee title in
the government is not essential to the existence of a public trust in tidelands. See Venice Peninsula
Properties,664 P.2d at 79, 87; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596, 138 P. 79, 87 (1913).
77. See, eg., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91(1972). In both of these cases, the respective states sued parenspatriaeon behalf of
citizens for protection against interstate nuisances of air and water pollution. In Tennessee Copper
Co., the Court determined that the protection of the general health, comfort and welfare of its inhabitants gave the state an interest sufficient to justify the litigation between a state and citizens of
another state for article III purposes. But see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). In
that case, the indication of state proprietary interests was sufficient for standing to sue in a federal
district court, but a state parenspatriaeinterest was not sufficient to support standing in that forum
to complain of damages to the "general economy."
78. See Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981). The Appeals Court in Colocotroniheld that where the Commonwealth had legislatively
authorized the bringing of suits for environmental damage, it had a cause of action to seek relief on
behalf of its citizens for the loss of natural resources on the land, such as animals and trees, from oil
spills. Id. at 670-71.
79. See, eg., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S.
465 (1888). In Bowman, the Court held that an Iowa statute prohibiting the importation of liquor by
common carrier was a regulation of commerce, not a quarantine, and that Iowa had the right to
regulate liquor after its transportation ended as a transaction of strictly internal concern to the
jurisdiction. In Mintz, a New York state regulation prohibiting importation of cattle without certification that the cattle were free of Bangs disease was upheld. The Court determined the state regulation did not conflict with a federal statute requiring inspection of cattle in quarantine areas and that
the particular concern of Bangs disease was not reached by congressional action. Therefore, such
regulation was left to the control of the states. Both cases represent the legitimate ends of state
regulation for the enhancement of public health, safety, security and quiet, which is upheld under
commerce clause challenges. Mintz, as stated in note 62, is the first case in which the Court abandoned the view that the exercise of a federal power is inherently exclusive, and asserted that a showing of exclusionary congressional intent is required. But see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978). There, the Court held that in the absence of authorizing federal authority, the
commerce clause prevents residents of one state from controlling the terms of resource development
and depletion in another state by prohibiting privately owned articles of trade from being shipped or
sold in interstate commerce on the grounds that the articles are needed by the people of the state to
satisfy local demand. Id. at 627-29.
80. See, eg., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Illinois v.
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The Tenth Amendment

The tenth amendment reserves for the constituent states or for the

people all powers neither delegated to the federal government nor pro-

hibited to the states.8 1 The amendment makes explicit the doctrine that
the original states possessed sovereign powers and reserved them when
they delegated the few enumerated powers to the federal government created by the Constitution. The use of the tenth amendment argument
protects and enhances the states' formal powers, claims of formal authority, and defenses of established autonomy.
In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,82 the Court found that wage
and hour determinations for state and municipal employees with respect
to "functions . . . which [state and local] governments are created to
provide, services. . . which the States have traditionally afforded their

citizens," 83 are matters "essential to [the] separate and independent exist-

ence" 84 of states, and, therefore, beyond the scope of the commerce
power of Congress to regulate. The Usery decision has been overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.8 5 However, the
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Huron represents a case in which the Court used the balancing test to weigh the burden of the effects of a local pollution control statute on interstate commerce
against the benefits of the statute. The burden in this case was determined to be the creation of a
situation in which different states might, but had not, imposed contradictory regulations which
would prevent certain kinds of commerce. The Court does not invalidate state law in instances of a
possible future occurrence.
81. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X. The Federalist suggested that states' rights are ultimately derived from rights of a state's citizens. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (J. Madison) (. Cooke ed.
1961). The original Constitution placed few restraints on congressional power which would favor
state sovereignty, but the tenth amendment has been viewed, even in the 1970's, as standing for the
constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a way which impairs states' integrity
or ability to function effectively in a federal system. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547
n.7 (1975). The Court found the tenth amendment argument significant, but overstated. Nevertheless, the Court declared that the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA) was constitutional as applied to
control of state statutory wage and salary increases to state employees. But see National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985). Usery is the only instance since 1937 in which the Court
held that Congressional regulation intruded on state sovereign powers.
82. Usery, 426 U.S. at 833.
83. Id. at 851.
84. Id. at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868)).
85. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985). The GarciaCourt held that municipal ownership
and operation of a mass transit system does not exempt the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMPTA) from the obligations of minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) under Usery. The Court held that the attempt to draw the boundaries
of state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with established principles of federalism, and the federalism principles on
which Usery is purported to rest. Therefore, Usery is overruled.
Tribe points out that the response to Usery was that the federalism balance had been taken from
congressional control by a federal judicial decision providing a doctrine of state protection and local
autonomy. Tribe contends that, in fact, the decision is best understood as one which creates a
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relevance of the Usery decision to state sovereignty and energy consumption issues is reviewed here.
The use of the tenth amendment argument increased after the Usery
decision, but the Usery test was a strict one.8 6 Federal legislation would
be invalid only if (1) the challenged statute regulated the "States as
States," (2) the federal regulation addressed matters which are, without
dispute, "attributes of state sovereignty," and (3) the "States' compliance
with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' ,8 The
Court appeared to shift the federalism line identifying protected traditional state functions. In both FERC v. Mississippi,8 8 and EEOC v. Wyoming,89 by assessing whether the challenged federal statute intruded on
traditional state interests, the Court moved away from the Usery
decision.
In FERC v. Mississippi, the state and its utility regulatory commission challenged titles I and III, and section 210 of title II of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Titles 19 and 11191
direct state utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities to
consider adopting and implementing specific rate design92 and regulatory
standards, 93 with procedural requirements of notice and opportunity for
public hearings in conjunction with the consideration and appropriateness determinations.9 4 They also allow such commissions and utilities to
implement or decline to implement the standards so long as written reasons are made available to the public. 95 Section 210 of title I196 seeks to
encourage and develop cogeneration facilities and small power production facilities, directing FERC, with public notice and comment, to procategory of states' rights derived from the legitimate claims of individuals to certain government
services which require financial interests of the state and local governments. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 5, §§ 5-20 to 5-22, at 300-18.
86. The Supreme Court has cited to the tenth amendment argument of Usery in 32 opinions
since that decision.
87. See Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (quoting
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854, 845, 852 (1976)).
88. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
89. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2613, 2621-2627, 2631-2634, 2641-2644 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6808
(1982).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (1982).
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-2622 (1982).

93. Id. §§ 2623-2627.
94. Id. § 2621(b).

95. Id. § 2621(c).
96. Id. § 824a-3.
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mulgate rules in consultation with state and regulatory authorities. 97
The rules would then be implemented by state authorities.
FERC is also authorized within title II to exempt cogeneration facilities and small power production facilities from certain state and federal

regulation as utilities.98 The federal district court held that titles I and
III and section 210 of title II were unconstitutional and void because

they exceeded congressional power under the commerce clause and constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the tenth
amendment. 99

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgment, holding that
the challenged provisions did not invade state sovereignty in relation to

the tenth amendment. The Court came to the following conclusions:
(1) the authorization of FERC in section 210 of title II to exempt qualified power facilities from state law and regulation only preempted con-

flicting state laws in traditional ways; 1°° (2) Congress, if it wished, may
preempt the states completely in regulation of retail sales by electric and
gas utilities and transactions between utilities and cogenerators, 0 because of the substantial interstate effect of the activity; 0 2 (3) PURPA

and the FERC rules governing its implementation only required the state
to settle disputes arising under the statute, an activity customarily en-

gaged in by the utility commission;0 3 (4) the "mandatory consideration"
97. Id. § 824a-3(e)(1).
98. Id. § 824a-3(e)(2).
99. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi is
unreported. The Secretary of Energy and FERC appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant
to title 28, section 1252 of the United States Code, which permits direct appeals from decisions
which invalidate Acts of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
100. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982). The Court stated that, on its face, this
PURPA provision appeared to be the most intrusive but the easiest to resolve since Congress can
preempt states completely in the regulation of retail sales by utilities and transactions between utilities and cogenerators. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 755. The Court stated that the specific congressional finding in section 2 of the Act
was that the regulated activities have an immediate effect on interstate commerce and require programs for increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and
resources by electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electricity consumers, as well as a program to improve the wholesale distribution of electric energy, and a program for the conservation of
natural gas, while ensuring that rates to gas consumers are equitable. Id.
The Court found that the legislative history provided ample support for Congress' conclusions,
The congressional findings are clear and specific. Congress was not irrational in concluding that
limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural gas and of the relationships between
cogenerators and electric utilities was essential to protect interstate commerce. The Court stated
that its role is not to say whether Congress chose the wisest means to improve the nation's energy
situation, but whether Congress was rational in concluding that the PURPA regulation was essential
to protect interstate commerce. Id. at 753-56.
103. Id. at 760. The implementing requirement of the statute was viewed by the Court as more
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provisions of titles I and III neither compelled the exercise of Mississippi's sovereign powers nor set a mandatory agenda for state decisionmakers, but instead, set requirements for continued state activity in a
preemptible field;" ° and finally, (5) the procedural requirements of the
Act did not compel a state to exercise its sovereign power or set the standards to be followed in all areas of the state commission's activities, but
where Congress might require a state administrative body to consider
proposed federal regulation, it also might require that certain procedures
be used during the state body's deliberation. 105
In EEOC v. Wyoming,'0 6 a supervisor of the Wyoming Game and
Fish Department, who was involuntarily terminated at age fifty-five pursuant to a Wyoming mandatory retirement statute, filed a complaint with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967107 (ADEA)

under section 1l(b), which extended the definition of "employer" to state
and local governments.1" 8 The EEOC's suit on behalf of the supervisor
and similarly situated persons was dismissed by the federal district court,
which held that, insofar as the Act regulated Wyoming's employment
relationship with game wardens and other law enforcement officials, it
violated the tenth amendment. That amendment, the court argued, gave
the states immunity from congressional attempts to extend the provisions

of the federal act to employees of a long-standing traditional service
(parks and recreation) of state and local governments. 109
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district
troublesome. Id. at 759. The Court determined, however, that the federal rights granted by
PURPA should be respected in the courts of the states and could be appropriately enforced through
the adjudicatory machinery of the Mississippi Commission. Id. at 760-61.
104. Id. at 769. The majority opinion held that the title I and III requirements must be upheld
under Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), since these requirements
of PURPA attach only if the state chooses to continue its regulatory efforts in the field. See also
supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. The tenth amendment challenge based on financial burden on the states was found unconvincing since the determinative factor in congressional activity is
the nature of federal action, not the ultimate economic impact on the states. Id. at 770 n.33. While
the partial dissent contended that Usery was undervalued by the decision, the Court distinguished
the holding of Usery by stating that the field covered by PURPA is preemptible and of interstate
concern. Id. at 769 n.32.
105. Id. at 770-71. The Court held, as in the issue of mandatory considerations, that Congress
may require a state administrative body to require procedural minima in its involvement in a
preemptible field. The federal requirements of notice and comment do not compel an exercise of a
state's sovereign power and they are not required in all areas of the state commission's tasks. Id. at
771.
106. 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
108. Id. § 630(bo).
109. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
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court, holding, as it did in FERC v. Mississippi, that the federal act in
question is a valid exercise of Congress' powers under the commerce
clause, both on its face and as applied in the case, and is not barred by
the constraints of the tenth amendment.110 The Court stated that the
claim of invalid commerce clause legislation can succeed only under the
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n test for determining whether a federal regulation is invalid within the Usery tenth amendment rule. 1 ' In using that test to analyze the federal age discrimination
statute, the Court determined that the first test requirement that the
challenged federal statute regulates the "States as States" was met." 2
The second requirement, that the federal statute address a matter that is
an indisputable "attribute of state sovereignty" was not resolved because,
in this instance, the third requirement, that the federal law will directly
impair the states' ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions," was not met. 1 3 The Act did not
impair the state in a way sufficient to override the choice of Congress to
extend its authority in this matter to the states, nor did it require the
state to abandon its public policy goal that Wyoming game wardens be
physically prepared to perform their duties. Under the Act, Wyoming
could still assess the fitness of its game wardens on an individual basis
and dismiss whom it reasonably found unfit, or continue to require retirement at age fifty-five if the state could demonstrate that age is a "bona
fide occupational qualification" for the job of game warden. Nothing in
the federal Act suggests it will have substantial or unintended consequential effects on other state decision making. 1 4
The clash of the tenth amendment powers reserved to the states and
the enumerated powers of Congress will continue after Garcia but in the
shape of the constitutional scheme rather than in the shape of predetermined ideas of sovereign power. The federalism issues are not at rest, but
the Court now views the federal government as being designed, in large
part, to protect the states from overreaching by Congress, and the states
as being more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in
the federal system rather than by judicially created limitations on federal
power. 115
110. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 (1983).
111. Id. at 1060. See also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 1061.
113. Id. at 1061-62.
114. Id. at 1062.
115. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135, 4144 (U.S. Feb.
19, 1985); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 180 & n.77.
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3. The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment provides that no state may be brought to
suit in federal court by a citizen of another state or a foreign citizen without the state's consent.' 16 The immunity of states from suit for retrospective relief may be viewed as an indirect state power of sovereign
autonomy since the amendment limits the freedom of citizens to litigate
against the state and deplete its state treasury.
The eleventh amendment becomes important in energy-related matters because of the provisions of a number of environmental statutes
which provide private citizens, including corporations and partnerships,
a federal cause of action for litigating interstate pollution problems.
These statutes are aimed at securing protection against inadequate state
and federal enforcement of the nation's environmental laws and standards. 17 The authority to commence a citizen's environmental suit
against any person, including the United States, extends to any governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment. Thus, federal legislation may provide private parties an inherently limited method of resolving interstate pollution problems.
Although the eleventh amendment operates to prohibit a citizen of
one state from using the federal courts to bring suit against another state
even under the laws of the United States, the Supreme Court has made
some distinctions. The amendment is no bar to suits against state officers
for violations of fourteenth amendment rights. Suits seeking injunctive
relief, which have an indirect effect on state resources or name a state
officer, and which do not name the state as the defendant, are not barred.
Agencies created by interstate compacts are not immune from suit, but
have been viewed as political subdivisions of states, rather than the arm
of the states." 8 The Court has also employed the concept of constructive
116. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend XI. See generally Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1978) (analyzing the argument that the amendment granted no
constitutional right of sovereign immunity to the states, but only allowed for the continuation of a
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity).
117. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1369 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7604, 7607 (1982). The sections generally authorize citizen civil suits to (1) secure compliance
with an emission standard of limitation under an act or implementation plan, (2) compel the EPA to
perform a nondiscretionary duty, and (3) restrain persons who propose to construct a facility without the appropriate permit. The civil suit provisions eliminate requirements of diversity.
118. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402-03
(1979).
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waiver of a state's permission to be sued.119 However, the current theory
that Congress, acting in accord with its article I powers, may provide

that states waive their immunity by compelling states to submit to suit in
federal court, or by compelling states to entertain specific federal claims

in their own courts, is limited by constitutional principles. First, Congress cannot confer authority on an article III court to resolve conflicts
outside the text of that article; second, congressional abrogation of im-

munity related to conferring jurisdiction must be reasonably ancillary to
a valid exercise of a federal law-making power; and third, the Supreme
Court must not infer inroads on state autonomy in a manner that goes

beyond the tenth amendment principle that Congress may 20not impair the
states' integrity or functioning within the federal system.'

C. Local Government Powers
Municipal corporation powers are first, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment
of the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation-not simply
12 1
convenient, but indispensable.

The allocation of power between states and municipal subdivisions
is similar in doctrine to state and federal allocation of governmental

power.'2 2 Local political self-governing subdivisions of the states are au119. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964). The eleventh amendment limits
only the judicial power. Congressional inroads on state sovereignty differ. In Parden, Alabama
citizens brought an action under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) against a railroad

owned by the State of Alabama and operated by the state in interstate commerce. The Alabama
constitution and its supreme court decisions foreclosed the possibility of consent to the suit. The
FELA provided that every common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce would be
liable in damages to injured employees in an action brought in a United States district court. The
Court held that sovereign immunity can be no bar when Congress authorizes federal courts to entertain suits within the powers "necessary and proper" to regulate interstate commerce. Where the
state has expressed nonconsent, consent can "arise from the act. . . within a sphere. . . subject to
the constitutional power of the federal government." Id. at 196. The Court stated that the question
of whether the state's act constitutes the alleged consent is one of federal law. Id. The dissenting
opinion appears to represent current practice: "Only when Congress has clearly considered the
problem and expressly declared that any State which undertakes given regulable conduct will be
deemed thereby to have waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation of this defense."
Id. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting).
120. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 n.7 (1975). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 3-37, at 139-43 (discussion of an alternative theory of eleventh amendment abrogation).
121. E. MCQUILLIN, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 367 (2d ed. 1940).
122. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 6, § 1.03, at 8-10. Engdahl notes that theoretically within the
federalism framework the state is the basic governmental unit with inherent, non-delegated powers
for all possible government concerns. The federal government powers were delegated to the states
and specifically enumerated in the final version of the Constitution. Local governments also derive
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thorized to regulate and tax within the powers of the specific enabling act
of each state. State law determines the acquisition of property within the
boundaries of municipal subdivisions and property rights acquired in private transactions. The doctrine of enumerated federal powers governs
the applicability of state law in the acquisition of property rights by the
123
United States.
The power to zone and regulate for land use at the municipal and
county levels directly affects energy exploration and development activity. Cities and counties have used the zoning power to govern land use
and the issuance of conditional use permits for planning and regulating
the environmental effects of energy resource development within their
jurisdictions. Challenges to general zoning ordinances are usually resolved at the state court level. As long as the local regulation furthers

some public interest, such zoning ordinances generally are upheld as permissible exercises of police power for which no compensation for taking
124
is due.
The requirement of permits by counties for oil drilling and mining
on private lands within county boundaries is an old and frequent regulatory device of local governments. During the 1970's, states, counties,
and municipalities attempted to extend permitting regulation to the ex-

ploration of federal lands within their boundaries, a practice which was
considered precluded by the supremacy of the federal mining statutes for
public lands.'2 County regulations governing the permitting of exploratheir powers from the state. One exception exists where state constitutions delegate home rule powers to municipalities for general categories of "local concern", as distinguished from statewide concern. Id.
123. Federal acquisition of property for other than article I purposes or without a state's consent
is not subject to state law where such state law frustrates the federal acquisition of title or diminishes
a clear, enumerated federal policy end, even if displacement of state law is not made explicit by
Congress. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593, 597 (1973). Where
federal acquisitions of property are not to effectuate federal policy within the enumerated concerns,
state law may constitutionally govern or even frustrate the acquisition from willing transferors to the
United States. See, eg., United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 93 (1950); United States v. Fox, 94
U.S. 315, 320-21 (1877).
124. The Supreme Court continues to hold that the application of a general zoning law to specific property is found to be a taking only when the ordinance does not advance legitimate governmental purposes or denies the owner sole or primary economic use of his land. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, AND J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 487. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980),
the Court indicated that even though the justices had not found zoning ordinances to constitute a
taking for a number of years, they still perceived a legitimate judicial role in determining whether a
zoning regulation maybe so unreasonable that it would constitute a taking. Id. at 260-61.
125. Although uncertainties exist as to what Congress may assert in relation to federal lands and
federal interests within a state, in many areas federal courts generally have upheld the application of
state permitting practices to federal interests within a state's borders. See California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). In California,a federal government application for a California permit
to appropriate water impounded by the New Melones Dam, constructed under the Reclamation Act
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tion and drilling on claims or leases on federal lands have not fared well
in litigation. 2 6 Similarly, local permitting requirements to establish mining claims on federal lands have been challenged. 127 The basic controversy in relation to state and local regulation which affects energy

development is that the requirements represent duplication, delay, and
increased costs. Local permitting may also conflict with existing state
of 1902, was approved by the state subject to a number of conditions. The United States sought a
declaratory judgment that the federal government may impound necessary unappropriated reclamation water without complying with state law. Id. at 647. The lower court held that the United
States was required to apply for an appropriation permit, but if sufficient unappropriated water
remained, the permit was to be issued without conditions. Id. The Court reversed and remanded,
holding that a state may impose any condition on the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
water in any federal reclamation project as long as the state requirement is not inconsistent with
clear congressional directives respecting the project. Id. at 674-76.
The Californiadecision is based on an analysis of congressional intent to sever water rights from
the public domain and consign the legislative control over the water to the states. See Act of Feb.
26, 1897, 43 U.S.C. § 664 (1982); Reclamation Act of 1902, §§ 5, 8, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383, 423e
(1982). Section 664 of the Act of 1897 provides for rights of way over reservoir sites and control and
regulation by the states in which such reservoirs are located. Section 5 of the Reclamation Act (reenacted in the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1982)), provides that no right to
the use of water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding 160 acres to any one
landowner who is a bona fide resident or resides in the neighborhood. The right attached upon full
payment for the land. Section 8, enacted in 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1982), defined the right to use of
the water acquired as appurtenant to the land and limited to beneficial use. Nothing in the Act was
intended to affect or interfere with state laws relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or any vested right acquired thereunder. The Secretary of the Inte.
rior was to proceed in implementing the Act in conformity with such laws. 438 U.S. at 677.
In California,the Court read section 8 of the Reclamation Act as requiring the Secretary of the
Interior to comply with state law in all instances of "control, appropriation, use or distribution" of
reclamation water not only when it is necessary to purchase or condemn vested water rights. Id. at
676. The dissent asserted that on a number of previous occasions, the Court had held that section 8
did not require the Secretary to follow state law in distributing project water since section 8 dealt
with the acquisition, not the distribution, of reclamation water. Id. at 691 (white, J., dissenting).
The majority did not reach the issue of the federal government's power to condemn state water
rights.
126. See Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'd, 445 U.S. 947
(1980). The Ninth Circuit held a county's attempt to require a use permit for continued drilling by a
federal licensee on national forest lands within the county's open space zoning designation to be a
violation of federal mineral leasing legislation. Id. at 1084, 1086. The court determined, in light of
the broad reading of the property clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 537-39 (1976),
where Congress has retained the power to enact legislation for public domain lands, federal enactment prevails over conflicting state laws for the federal lands within that state's jurisdiction. 601
F.2d at 1083.
127. See Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982). The Supreme
Court of Colorado ruled the El Paso County Board of Commissioners was without jurisdiction to
apply its zoning ordinances in such a way as to deny a special use permit to test drill on unpatented
mining claims in order to establish a mining claim on federal land within the county. Id. at 1054.
The court determined the Board was barred because the local ordinance was in conflict with requirements of federal mining law that all valuable mineral deposits in land belonging to the United States
"shall be free and open to exploration and purchase," and because denial of the permit prohibited a
use of federal property which was authorized by federal law. Id. at 1057-58.
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plans for conservation and reclamation for the same project which continues the cycle of delay for the developer.
D.

Indian Governmental Powers
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation,
which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is
there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is
not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its
own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of
a State, is not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with
Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so
far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely
incomprehensible. 128
1. Indian Tribal Powers

The rights and duties of Indian tribes and their members are not
delegated but are based on inherent internal tribal sovereignty which has
never been dissolved by the federal government.129 The only formal limit
on tribal sovereign powers is by virtue of the protectorate relationship
with the federal government and the resulting federal statutes, of terms
of treaties, and of restraints implied by tribal incorporation within the
United States.1 3 However, under the protection of the federal govern128. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 263-64 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
129. The powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (emphasis
in original). Sovereignty as a term is not applied in the sense of sovereignty in an international law
context, but rather, as in the context of state sovereignty, that tribes exercise a substantial, independent authority within the American constitutional system. Id. at 322-23. Most external powers of
Indian sovereignty were lost by tribal incorporation within the Republic. Id. at 323. The federal
government did, however, recognize the tribes' capability to make treaties except with foreign nations. Id. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 229-57 (1982 ed.)
(source and scope of tribal authority in Indian affairs).
130. The courts have recognized the political independence and self-government status of Indian
tribes since the beginning of the Republic. In cases from 1823 to 1832, Chief Justice Marshall set
forth the analyses of tribal-federal and tribal-state relationships. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), Marshall stated
that the United States had succeeded to European claims and followed the policy of entering into
alliances with tribes through treaties, thus acknowledging the sovereign status of the Indian tribes.
Id. at 558-59. Indian nations were considered "distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States." Id. at 557.
Marshall stated that the United States had assumed a role of "protector" to assure tribal integrity for
self-governing entities within a geographical territory. Id. at 555. This fiduciary relationship with
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ment, the tribes have lost the sovereign powers to carry on relations with
nations other than the United States,"' to transfer tribal land without

federal approval, 132 to regulate non-Indians when no tribal interest justifies regulation, 13 3 and to impose criminal jurisdiction on non-Indians.1 34
Moreover, these limitations on Indian self-government are strictly construed by the Supreme Court.
The scope of the implied limitations on Indian sovereignty1 3S and
the protection of the remaining sovereignty by the authority of the

United States provide the framework for litigation relative to Indian, federal, and state powers in Indian country. The precise limits of Indian
tribal powers cannot be defined since the powers are not delegated or
restrained by any limitations of the Constitution on federal and state authority. Tribal powers extend over tribal members and territories.1 36

Tribal lawmaking powers include those of tribal sovereignty as well as
the federal government preserved tribal government and protected it from state interference. Id. at
555-56.
131. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In Cherokee Nation, Chief
Justice Marshall defined tribes as "domestic dependent nations" which could not make treaties or
political alliances with foreign nations. Id. at 17. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147
(1810), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832), overruled, Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), the Court determined Indian tribes could not enter into direct
commercial or government relations with foreign nations.
132. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall concluded
in Johnson that the "discovery" by European nations diminished the natives' sovereignty as independent nations to the extent they have a legal claim to retain possession and use of land, but the
power to dispose of Indian land at will was denied. Id. at 574.
133. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The Court held that the Crow Tribe
lacked inherent civil authority to regulate fishing of non-Indians on non-Indian land within the
boundaries of the Crow reservation when no important tribal interest was at issue. Id. at 563-65.
134. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Court restated that
tribal territorial jurisdiction to try non-Indian criminal defendants impliedly was terminated when
the tribes were incorporated into the United States and the dependent relationship with the federal
government was created. Id. at 206, 209. The Court's analysis was based on a review of congressional actions indicating tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians except where permitted
by treaty. Id. at 203-08. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 244-46 (discussion of the tribal
powers implicitly lost under Supreme Court decisions).
Lack of criminal jurisdiction over all Indians who are non-members of their tribes is not as
clear. Under federal statutes concerning federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, non-member Indians have been treated in the same manner as tribal members. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153,
1165, 3113, 3242, 3243 (1982) (interracial crimes, trespassing for fish and game, liquor violations,
and bail for offenses); see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (constitutional restraints on
federal and state governments do not limit Indian tribes). However, civil rights of persons under the
authority of Indian tribes are now codified with certain restraints on the tribes. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302,
1303 (1982) (codification of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968).
135. See generally Collins, Implied Limitationson the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L.
REv. 479 (1979).
136. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 246-57. Cohen provides a generic list of tribal
sovereign powers including the substantive powers to (1) determine the form of tribal government,
(2) determine tribal membership, (3) legislate, (4) administer justice, (5) exclude persons from tribal
territory, and (6) determine how these powers may be exercised over non-Indians.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/1

40

Dodson: Jurisdictional Powers of Governments and Individual Rights in Ene

1985]

ENER GY REGULATION JURISDICTION

those delegated by Congress. 137 The regulation and protection of reservation property, including land and resources, are internal tribal matters
within a tribe's legislative jurisdiction. 3 '
One of the primary purposes for creating reservations was to provide Indian nations with control over resources necessary for the achieve-

ment of economic self-sufficiency. 139 Therefore, the extent of the tribal

legislative power can be highly significant, especially as it relates to the
regulation of Indian energy resources. The tribal power to exclude persons from tribal territory is related to a tribe's ability to protect its territory and members as a matter of sovereignty."4 This power is becoming

increasingly important as tribes form their own plans for developing their
mineral resources. 141 The tribe needs no grant of authority from the federal government to exercise the exclusion power, either as a government
or landowner, 42 although the power is subject to limitation or abolition
by congressional action.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). The Mazurie Court held that
Congress had the authority to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages by non-Indians on feepatented lands within an Indian reservation and delegate that authority to a reservation tribal council. Id. at 716, 718.
138. See Merrion v. Jicarrilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The Supreme Court upheld
tribal jurisdiction to regulate and tax non-Indians with respect to grazing cattle and trading license
fees, zoning of fee land owned by non-Indians within reservation boundaries, and taxation of extraction of resources from tribal lands. Id. at 140-41; see also Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904)
(Indian legislation imposing a tax on livestock owned by non-Indians was permissible); Buster v.
Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905) (permit tax to conduct business on Indian land could be assessed
against non-Indians), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
139. See Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979 (1981). Clinton observes that economic
development on Indian reservations usually occurs through non-Indian resources and labor which
transfers the economic value of Indian resources to non-Indians. This disparate proportion of return
to Indian tribes varies according to the use of resources and the management practices employed.
See also Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 19,
25 (1977) ("Indian reservations were intended to be a permanent home where the Indians could
become secure and self-sustaining.").
140. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled, Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). The Worcester Court stated that persons were allowed to enter Cherokee land only "with the assent of the Cherokees." Id. at 561. Congressional acts for trade and
intercourse are evidence of federal concern in relation to the power to exclude persons such as trespassers on Indian lands. See, eg., Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139, 141-42 (1802); Act of
May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469-70 (1796); Act of March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329-30 (1793).
However, a tribe cannot exclude persons who hold valid federal patents from such fee lands within
the tribe's reservation although the tribe may regulate activity on those lands as delegated by Congress and zone fee land owned by non-Indians. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
141. See Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal Jurisdictionto Tax Non-Indians,40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 166 (1976); Israel, The Reemergence of TribalNationalism andIts Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 617, 634-52 (1976); and Note, Indian Tribes: SelfDetermination Through Effective Management of Natural Resources, 17 TULSA L.J. 507 (1982).
142. See, eg., I Op. Att'y Gen. 465 (1821) (right of Indians to exclusive possession of their lands
recognized); 55 INTERIOR DEc. 14, 48-50 (1934) (powers of Indian tribes).
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The right of Indian tribes to tax the production of their resources by
non-Indian lessees was resolved in large part by Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe.14 3 As recently as August, 1983, the United States Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo
Tribe,1" that the Navajo Tribal Council for the Utah reservation of Navajo Indians has the power to tax oil and gas leases and mineral sales
despite extensive federal regulation of the oil and gas activities on the
145
reservation.
The uncertainties and difficulties of developing Indian land and energy resources cause the tribes to be cautious and slow to act within their
powers. Tribal concerns for the future of their lands cause Indian tribes
and their councils to weigh carefully whether energy resource development will stimulate the growth of a real economy for the individual reser1 46
vation and its Indians.
143. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The Merrion Court upheld the tribal jurisdiction of the Jicarilla
Apache tribe to tax non-Indians for extraction of resources from tribal lands. Id. at 140.
144. 715 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1983).
145. The Navajo tribe imposed taxes on the value of mineral interests and on gross receipts on
the leases which the plaintiffs had held for thirty years on the reservation in Utah. The state of Utah
and San Juan County had also collected such taxes on these leases. Id. at 488. The plaintiffs argued
I) preemption, despite the Indian Mineral Leasing Act; and 2) that Indian land taxation not subject
to federal review or approval might be disruptive of federal energy policy. Id. at 488-89. The appeals court determined that the Navajo tribe had the power to tax under Jicarillaand parties attacking the power had the burden to show the power had been modified, conditioned, or divested by
congressional action. Id. at 489. The court rejected the appellants' argument that the Navajo tribe
had not chosen to organize and adopt a constitution under the Indian Reorganization Act and,
therefore, taxes imposed by the Navajo tribe would not be reviewed and approved by the Secretary of
the Interior, as provided in the constitution of the organized Jicarilla tribe, resulting in a possible
disruption of federal energy policies. Id. The court stated that it reached its holding in order to
"comport with traditional notions of sovereignty and the federal policy to encourage tribal independence." Id. at 490 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).
The Supreme Court had held in Jicarilla that it was not necessary to reach the question of
commerce clause applicability since Congress had specifically allowed the organized tribes to tax
under the Reorganization Act and, therefore, the Jicarillatax did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. Id. at 490-91. In Southland Royalty the Tenth Circuit held that the Navajo tax was
similarly immune from commerce clause scrutiny and should be upheld under Jicarilla. Id. The
appellants also argued that the Navajo tax was a duplication of taxes and claimed they should be
permitted discovery to determine how the tribe intended to use the proceeds relative to the state
severance tax on oil produced on Navajo lands. Id. at 490. The appeals court noted that taxation by
two entities is not necessarily unconstitutional, id., and the issue of the validity of the state severance
tax on oil produced on Indian lands was outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 491-92.
146. See, eg., 18 N.T.C. § 1154 (1977). This section requires the restoration of damages caused
by any oil and gas activities. Such regulations do not cause preemption issues to arise with related
federal statutes. See generally Pendley & Kolstad, American Indians and NationalEnergy Policy, 5
J. ENERGY & DE. 221 (1980) (discussion of role of Indians in energy development and policy). The
Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) advocates the profitable development of mineral
reserves on Indian lands, more tribal control over exploration and development, and a fair share of
the economic benefits from mineral agreements comparable to those available to private landowners.
CERT contends, for example, that recent escalation of domestic mineral and fossil fuel development
has increased bonus and royalty rates on mineral interests dramatically, but rates for development
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2.

Federal Powers

The commerce clause of the United States Constitution provides:
"The Congress shall have Power To.

.

.regulate Commerce.

.

.with

Tribes."147

the Indian
The clause is the only enumerated constitutional
power that expressly mentions Indian tribes.14 As a result, federal legislation pursuant to other enumerated powers has been construed to apply
to Indian affairs. While the power of Congress over the American Indians may be considered plenary, it is limited in fact to the Indian commerce clause and the other clauses of the Constitution which have been
applied in federal management of Indian affairs. 14 9
The power over Indian affairs is unique in the federal system because the power has developed into a federal police power authority to
legislate for the health, safety, and morals of minority citizens within a
self-governing unit.15° Although tribal powers regulate the internal matters of Indian tribes, federal legislation governs the exercise of Indian
sovereignty and tribal relationships with federal and state gove'nments. 151 Most of the regulation of individual Indians and tribes has
on Indian lands with the approval of the federal government remain essentially the same. THE
COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT (1982).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
148. Indians are mentioned three times in the Constitution. In addition to the Indian commerce
clause in article I, section 8, "Indians not taxed" are excluded by article I, section 2, clause 3, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3, and amendment XIV from the "free persons" to be counted for apportionment of representatives and taxes among the states. Id. amend. XIV. Constitutional powers which
have been applied indirectly to Indian affairs include the following: the presidential power in article
II, section 2, clause 2, to make treaties, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the judicial power in article III, section
2, clause 1, which extends to cases arising under treaties, id. art. III, § 2, cl.1, the supremacy power
of article VI, section 2, that all treaties are law of the land, id. art. VI, § 2, and the congressional
powers within the article IV property clause, id. art. IV, and the welfare clause for expenditures in
article I, section 8, clause 1. Id. art. I, § 8, cl.
1. The practice of treaty making was discontinued by
Congress in 1871, but many Indian treaties and their obligations remain in force. Congress may
abrogate treaties by specific legislation with the sole requirement that, under the fifth amendment,
just compensation be paid for any extinguished tribal right. The federal government began to assert
federal power to regulate internal relations of Indian tribes after 1871. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883); Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885); see also Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974). The Court in Morton stated that the plenary power of Congress to deal with
the special problems of the Indians is implicit and explicit in the Constitution. Id. at 551-52. Preferential employment for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), as provided by the
Indian Reorganization Act, therefore, was not discriminatory but held to be in furtherance of Indian
self-determination. Id. at 553-55.
149. See Kearl, CongressionalPower, Trust Responsibilitiesand JudicialReview in Indian Affairs,
2 J. ENERGY L. & PoL'Y 47 (1981) (citing the use of the taxing and defense powers and Congress's
power regarding national citizenship).
150. See F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 219. Indians are American citizens by virtue of a number
of acts. The Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982), made "all non-citizen Indians born
within the territorial limits of the United States" American citizens.
151. The concept of dependent sovereign status of Indian tribes as protectorates of the United
States, which was established by early treaties and federal judicial decisions, had changed to the
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been by statute although presidential executive orders have also created

fights for Indians in setting aside land for Indian tribes."5 2 Treaties still
remain important, however, since they are the documents which reserve
property rights to tribes, establish equitable title to surface and subsurface estates, and protect hunting, fishing, and water rights on reservations in exchange for the original land cessions made by the Indians. 5 3
In general, the federal fiduciary role and trusteeship is a body of

legal rules which protect Indian tribes from state and non-Indian intruconcept of a federal trusteeship authority by the end of the nineteenth century. The Court has
attempted to dispel the resulting confusion over whether a federal authority exists separate and
distinct from the power of the Indian commerce clause. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), overruled, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The Court
held that the rights of a reservation Indian were violated when the state collected an income tax
which it had no jurisdiction to impose. Id. at 172. The Court stated that modem cases tend to reject
platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and look to the applicable treaties and federal statutes to
define the limits of state power. Id. A critical reading of the McClanahan opinion suggests that the
Court did not fully comprehend the doctrinal structure in Worcester, and that the Indian sovereignty
doctrine to which the Court makes reference is the dormant Indian commerce clause portion of
Worcester.
The exercise of a congressional and Bureau of Indian Affairs fiduciary relationship over the
affairs of individual Indians in large part has disappeared. But see 25 U.S.C. § 404 (1982) (approval
of the Secretary of Interior is required for the sale of Indian land). The federal government still
plays a fiduciary role as legal trustee of the twelve million acres of Indian land held in trust for
allottees and their successors in interest and the forty million acres held for particular tribes. See
COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN
NATURAL RESOURCES I (Comm. Print 1972); Clinton, supra note 139, at 1002 n.135; Note, supra

note 141, at 518. However, in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980), the Court held that the
Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887 did not impose any trust obligation on the federal govern.
ment within the Act to manage allotted trust lands since Congress intended that an individual Indian
allottee would farm and manage the allotted land. Id. at 542-43.
152. Although Congress has since prohibited the use of executive orders to withdraw public
lands for Indian reservations, 43 U.S.C. § 150 (1982), the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the reservations created by executive order. See, eg., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 316 U.S. 317, 325 (1942). Congress has ratified most of the actions, but two million acres still
are held by Indian tribes outside of Alaska pursuant only to executive order. H.R. REP. No. 2503,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-74 (1953).
153. The President's power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate includes

treaties made with Indian tribes. See 2

INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES

(C. Kappler ed.

1904), for a compilation of Indian treaties. Although treaty making with tribes was ended by statute
in 1871, obligations in existing treaties were not to be impaired. Act of March 3, 1971, ch. 120, 16
Stat. 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)). Today, treaties still constitute a primary source
of federal Indian law. See F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 811-12, 816. Treaties with Indian tribes
differ from treaties with foreign sovereigns in two important aspects. First, special canons of construction apply which construe Indian treaties in favor of the Indians as they would have understood
them. See, eg., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). In addition, courts
will not find that Indian treaties have been abrogated by subsequent treaties or legislation unless the
latter enactments show clearly and specifically that abrogation was intended. See, e.g., Washington
v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, JudicialReview
ofIndian Treaty Abrogation" "As Long as Water Flows, or GrassGrows Upon the Earth'--HowLong
a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975) (discussion of judicial tests used in determining if an
Indian treaty has been abrogated).
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sions and require mandated programs to be federally administered by the
Department of the Interior for the benefit of the tribes and their resources. While federal trusteeship obligations toward the Indians are
clear, especially in relation to holding legal title to Indian lands, the right
of the federal government to regulate Indian affairs within an enumerated power is not so clear.154
Since Congress has begun a process which turns over tribal resource
management by the Office of Trust Responsibility within the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to tribal governments, 155 the Secretary of the Interior may transfer the authority of programs to manage land use planning,
forest and range management, timber sales, agricultural leasing, and the
maintenance of land use records to the tribes. Nevertheless, Congress
explicitly prevents the Secretary from abrogating federal trust responsi156
bilities to the tribe in matters relating to tribal resources.
154. While the courts, on one hand, have allowed Congress more discretion over Indian affairs,
they have also enforced stringent legal duties on the federal officers and agencies for Indian affairs
based on strict review of the principle of "trust responsibility" of the federal government for Indian
interests. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935) (unless Congress directs
otherwise, the federal executive must exercise a strict standard of compliance with fiduciary duties of
due care, loyalty, and subordination of a trustee interest to those of its beneficiary); see also Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-57 (D.D.C. 1972) (Secretary of Interior, as
trustee for the tribe, was required by trust responsibility to administer reclamation statutes in such a
way that they did not interfere with Indian rights), rev'd on othergrounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). But see Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
The Court held that where Congress has a dual responsibility to protect water rights for Indian
tribes and obtain water rights for reclamation, the federal trustee obligation to a tribe is not compromised because the government represented other interests as well. Id. at 2917, 2921. The Court
stated that the law of private trustees and fiduciaries does not apply in instances where Congress has
decreed the federal government has the dual responsibilities of supervision of Indian tribes and the
commencing of reclamation projects in areas adjacent to Indian lands. Id. at 2917. Where Congress
chose to so legislate, it would be unrealistic for the government not to perform its obligation to
represent Indian tribes in litigation where Congress has obliged the government to represent other
interests as well. Id. at 2921.
155. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450450n (1982).
156. See id. §§ 450j(f), 450n(2). However, trust responsibilities also represent a bureaucratic
conflict of interest when national energy policy commits the federal government to developing energy supplies such as strippable coal and oil and gas which can be produced from Indian lands.
Several proposals have been made in administrations to avoid the governmental conflict. See, eg.,
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 7 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRE. Doc. 894 (July 8, 1970). President Nixon proposed the creation of an independent
Indian Trust Council Authority to manage, enforce and protect Indian property rights. Id. Since
the Linowes Commission report in January, 1982, the Department of the Interior has established the
Minerals Management Service (MMS) for federal and Indian lands to rectify Interior's procedures
for the management and auditing of revenue reports on production. Several large tribes have begun
using sophisticated managerial and legal techniques to assure mineral extraction is environmentally
sound, efficient, and economically rewarding. 4 CERT (The Council of Energy Resource Tribes)
REP. 2-4 (Sept. 13, 1982).
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The effective use of tribal mineral and water resources requires the

resolution of a number of legal problems and practices. The legal status
of land ownership on many reservations needs to be made more clear and

less complex. 15 7 While Congress can resolve boundary and land title disputes by statutorily establishing an executive or judicial procedure and

setting forth criteria to be applied in the adjudication of issues among
Indian tribes or between tribes and non-Indians, the conflicts may require a series of enactments and litigation over long periods of time.'

In addition, tribal self-determination in the development of tribal energy
resources must occur within a complex arrangement of existing federal
administrative, executive, and legislative directives for Indian tribal self59
determination. 1
157. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 471-507. The property interests of Indian tribes
are a unique form of property right in the American legal system. The interests are determined by
the federal trust over the land and restrained from alienation by statute. While the interest itself is a
form of ownership in common, individual tribal members have no inheritable or alienable interest in
tribal property. Federal law generally protects beneficial use of the lands by tribes. Congress provides compensation for the extinguishment of rights whether acquired by action of a prior government, aboriginal possession, treaty, act of Congress, executive action, or purchase. The precise title
granted to a tribe is not significant because the restrictions on alienation and other attributes of
Indian land apply equally to all tribal lands held in trust by the federal government.
158. In regard to the Navajo-Hopi land dispute, see Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138
(9th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972);
Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Axiz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1962); Act of July 22, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-547, 72 Stat. 403 (1958); Act of Dec. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712
(1974) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d-24 (1982)). Partition negotiation failed and judicial partition
was litigated in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ariz. 1978), affid in part and rev'd in part, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980).
159. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982)); Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (1982)) (allow for greater tribal self-determination by
vesting self-government, corporate organization, credit, and land purchase authority in the tribes).
President Reagan created a nine member Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies Commission to advise on the promotion of new business and industry in private enterprise
under tribal leadership. Exec. Order No. 12,401 (Jan. 14, 1983). The functions of the Commission
include:
1) [d]efining the existing Federal legislative, regulatory, and procedural obstacles to the
creation of positive economic environments of Indian reservations[;]
2) [i]dentifying and recommending changes or other remedial actions necessary to remove these obstaclesL;]
3) [d]efining the obstacles at the State, local, and tribal government levels which impede
both Indian and non-Indian private sector investments on reservations[;]
4) [i]dentifying actions which these levels of government could take to rectify the identified problems[ and]
5) [r]ecommending ways for the private sector, both Indian and non-Indian, to participate in the development and growth of reservation economies, including capital
formation.
Id. The Commission panel members reported key problems which they found to include the following: (1) American Indians lack expertise in management and in planning development; (2) many
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3.

Indian Commerce Clause

The framers of the Constitution gave the federal government complete control over commerce with Indian tribes because of the friction
between tribes and states over state boundaries and because of western

land claims which conflicted with Indian title to land in or adjacent to
the states. 160 Modern federal Indian law still attempts to maintain the
geographic boundaries and jurisdiction for Indian country so that state
regulation can not intrude. Any congressional efforts enacted under the

Indian commerce clause to assimilate Indians into the dominant society
by abrogating federal supervision over property and rights of Indian
tribes are in fact intrusions on Indian internal affairs,16 1 but the efforts
appear to be accepted by the courts in dicta.1 62 Congress has allocated
tribal governments are too unstable to attract industry; and (3) the question of who has legal jurisdiction over contracts--state, federal, or tribal officials-remains unanswered. Tulsa World, Jan. 11,
1984, at CIO col. 1.
160. See Clinton & Hotopp, JudicialEnforcement of the FederalRestraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REv. 17, 19-23 (1979). The First
Congress specified federal restraints on alienation of Indian land applied to any state, whether or not
the state had preemptive rights to the land. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790).
161. See Kearl, supra note 149, at 47-50. The assimilation of Indians into the dominant society
was intended by the enactment of the Indian Allotment Act of 1887, which allotted tribal lands to
individual tribal Indians to farm and manage. Indian Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 336, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1982)). In the 1950's, a
federal policy process of termination of tribes was set forth which would "abolish federal supervision
over tribes as soon as possible and subject the Indians to the same laws, privileges, and responsibilities as other citizens of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 108, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1953). The
fourteen individual termination acts which followed ended the federal trust relationship with these
tribes and their members for most purposes, although federal authority over personal property in
some instances was delegated to private trustees and some tribal hunting, fishing, and water rights
were not abrogated. See F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 811-12, 816. The issue has not been litigated,
but the federal trust responsibility to protect these resources seems to continue with these rights. Id.
at 812 n.l1. State legislative and judicial jurisdiction was imposed for most purposes and most
exemptions from state taxing authority were terminated. Id. at 816. Termination acts do not, however, abolish the treaties or tribal sovereignty. Id. at 812-13. Tribal jurisdictional rights are not
ended technically, but without land on which to exercise jurisdiction, they are without effect. Id. at
815. The federal courts have upheld the authority of Congress to enact termination legislation. See,
eg., Otradovec v. First Wis. Trust Co., 454 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1972); Crain v. First Nat'l Bank, 324
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963). Litigation has occurred, which relates to the broad administrative authority delegated to the Department of Interior, to carry out the details of termination. See, eg., Duncan
v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337, 1341-44 (Ct. Cl. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Duncan v.
Andrus, 517 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
162. Limitations of congressional power under the Indian commerce clause are not well-defined
in relation to the regulation of tribes' internal affairs, and the issue has never been addressed by the
courts except in dicta. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). The Wheeler Court
stated that the sovereignty of Indian tribes is unique and limited, exists at the sufferance of Congress,
and is subject to congressional defeasance. Id.; see also Delaware Tribal Business Comm'n v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974). Indian commerce clause
limitations on congressional action may be similar to interstate commerce clause limitations on Congress. The Court has held only once that the federal government did not have the authority to
regulate Indian activities. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) (federal crimi-
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some governing authority over Indian country to the states, 16 3 and exercises some governing authority itself, 1 " but the current federal practice
basically is to protect and support tribal self-government. 6 '
The Indian commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate
the federal government, states, and non-Indians in their relations with
individual Indians and tribes. Congress can directly regulate individual
Indians on and off the reservation as well as Indian tribes in their relations with one another, the federal government, states, and non-Indians.
Moreover, federal power is not limited to the reservation. Congress can
make treaty provisions granting Indians off-reservation fishing, hunting,
and gathering rights 166 and providing tax exemptions by statute for offreservation tribal real property. 1 67 The Supreme Court has upheld and

enforced such provisions under the presumption that federal authority is
not as strong in off-reservation matters so that states, with restrictions,
may regulate off-reservation fishing rights 66 and impose types of taxanal jurisdiction over Indian lands was interpreted narrowly as not constituting "commerce"). The
Supreme Court, to date, has been unwilling to exercise any effective check on the exercise of congressional authority in Indian affairs, relying instead on the theory of inherent federal trusteeship. See
Clinton, supra note 139, at 996-1001 (description of the shift of the Court over time to the recognition of the Indian commerce clause as the exclusive source of federal power).
163. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982) (state jurisdiction authorized in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin over offenses committed by or against Indians in specific
areas of Indian country within those states to the extent that the state has jurisdiction over the
offenses committed elsewhere in the state); 25 U.S.C. §§ 231-233 (1982) (enforcement of state laws
affecting health, education, and the entry of state employees on Indian lands); 25 U.S.C. §§ 13211326 (1982) (assumption by the state of criminal and civil jurisdiction over offenses and civil actions
in Indian country as well as the steps for assuming the exercise of the authority); see also Goldberg,
PublicLaw 280: The Limits ofStateJurisdiction OverReservation Indians,22 U.C.L.A. L. RnV. 535
(1975) (analysis of the effects of 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) on Indian and state relationships).
164. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain offenses committed in Indian country against the person or property of another Indian or other person); see also
Tulsa World, Jan. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (report on the modern justice system for the Indians, as
well as the complexities and confusion under this section).
165. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1982) (tribes given the right to organize, incorporate, and adopt
a constitution and bylaws); 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982) (imposes Bill of Rights guarantees on tribal
governments).
166. These treaty provisions have been the basis of the controversy over fishing disputes in the
Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes region. See, eg., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp.
192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981). See generally Johnson, The States Versus
Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United StatesSupreme CourtError,47 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1972)
(discussion of states' power to regulate off-reservation fishing).
167. See, e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); but see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1973) (state may tax any revenue the tribe derives from exempt land when the
state charge can fairly be denominated as a fee for services).
168. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1977) (off-reservation fishing rights are subject to reasonable regulation by the state pursuant to its power to conserve
an important natural resource); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (such things as the
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tion on off-reservation tribal land not protected by a federal statutory
grant of immunity from state taxation.
Federal law establishing an Indian reservation preempts states from
regulating any tribal activity on the reservation. The most distinct factor
which distinguishes preemption law in federal Indian law from other
fields is the role of the tribes as distinct political sovereign units in the
federal system. Broad preemption of state laws has been viewed consistently as an implication of the federal policy to protect tribal sovereignty. 169 Over time, the Supreme Court has developed rules of
construction in relation to the scope of preemption of state law which
include: (1) interpretation of treaties with Indians as the Indians would
have understood them,17 ° and (2) interpretation in favor of retaining tribal self-government and property rights against state law claims. 1 ' Ambiguities in treaties and agreements are resolved in the Indian's favor,
and federal Indian laws are interpreted liberally to carry out the purposes
of trustee protection.' 72 However, the Court also respects the independmanner of fishing and hunting, the size of the take, and the like may be regulated by the State in the
interest of conservation, provided the regulation does not discriminate against the Indians).
169. See F. COHEN, supra note 129, at 270-79. Cohen explains that the Supreme Court has
consistently followed the principle that the Constitution delegates the authority over Indian affairs to
the federal government. In addition, Indian treaties, statutes, and executive orders preempt the
application of state laws which would apply because of the states' jurisdiction over persons and
property within their geographic boundaries. But see Clinton, State PowerOver Indian Reservations:
A CriticalComment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REV. 434 (1981). Clinton claims that the
Burger Court has attempted to maximize the extent of state authority in Indian country and retain a
limited, self-governing tribal enclave, thus destroying the traditional analytical framework established in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), which
mandated that tribal sovereignty be maintained. Id. at 439-40.
170. For an example of the progression of the Supreme Court's application of this rule of construction, see Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970) (treaties were not arm'slength transactions; thus, any doubtful expressions in them should be resolved in the Indians' favor),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (Court will
construe a treaty with the Indians as they understood it and as justice and reason would demand);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-54 (1832) (interpreting the treaty of Hopewell, a
treaty between the United States and the Cherokees), overruled, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
171. See, eg., Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 484 (1979) ("[A]mbiguities
in legislation affecting retained tribal sovereignty are to be construed in favor of the Indians.");
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973) ("[R]eservation of certain
lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the
prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos
under general federal supervision."), overruled, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556, 568-70 (1883) (purpose of arrangements with the Indians was to secure to them an orderly selfgovernment, regulated by themselves but subject to their allegiance, as Indians, to the laws of the
United States).
172. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 200 (1975) ("[D]oubtful expressions, instead of
being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless
people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith.")
(citing Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85
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ent role of the states within the federal system by withholding findings of

preemption in cases which are doubtful. 173 In addition, as in all preemption cases, Congress can authorize state jurisdiction by superseding, re-

pealing, or amending a treaty or statute which preempts state laws and
specifically apply state laws to Indian country.1 74
A primary federal purpose in recognizing tribal sovereignty and ter-

ritory is to preserve the economic resources-land, forests, minerals, fish,
game, and water-reserved for Indian self-support. The mineral reserves

located on the 52 million acres of Indian lands,1 75 and the water reserved
for Indian use in the western states, 176 provide the potential for energy
(1942) (it is the Supreme Court's responsibility to generously recognize the full obligation of the
United States to protect the interests of the Indians).
173. See, eg., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
174. See 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982) (incorporates applicable state law to determine heirship, descent, and partition of allotted lands); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1982) (assumption of state jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982) (delegates state jurisdiction over civil
actions in areas of Indian country within six states).
175. See Barry, An Energy Dichotomy for the 80's, 2 AMER. INDIAN J. 18 (1980). No official
government data has existed on mineral resources and reserves on Indian lands. See Note, supra
note 141, at 527; telephone interview with David Baldwin, Director of Division of Energy Mineral
Resources, Bureau of Indian Affairs (Jan. 15, 1982). Until 1980, the area offices of the BIA handled
mineral development. See Note, supra note 141, at 527. At that time, because of the increased
activity of Indian energy resource development, the BIA determined that one centralized office, the
Division of Energy and Mineral Resources, located in Lakewood, Colorado, as part of the Office of
Trust Responsibility within the BIA, could provide more expertise and oversight. This Division and
the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management have completed the first inventory of
Indian mineral resources; however, data is confidential and not available to the public. Interview
with David Baldwin, Director of Division of Energy and Mineral Resources, Bureau of Indian Affairs, in Lakewood, Colorado (Oct. 14, 1982) (notes on file at National Energy Law & Policy Institute, University of Tulsa College of Law). However, the Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT)
reports that thirty-one tribes produce oil and gas on Indian lands and twelve additional tribes have
leases without production. Testimony of E. Gabriel, Executive Director of the Council of CERT
before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Appropriations (March 25,
1981). Three tribes have production of coal and uranium. Id. But see COMMISSION ON FISCAL
ACCOUNTABILrrY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES, REPORT OF THE COMMISION, at 115
(Jan. 1982), which reports that of the 300 federally recognized tribes, 240 have energy resources
most of which are not developed. Twenty-seven tribes are producing oil and gas, two produce coal
and uranium, and two produce non-energy resources. CERT estimates its twenty-nine member
tribes own one-third of the strippable coal in the western states, four to five percent of onshore oil
and gas resources, and forty percent of the privately-owned uranium in the United States. See Note,
supra note 141, at 528; see also Pendley and Kolstad, supra note 146, at 223-33 (description of the
national perspective of tribal lands and resources).
176. See Moses, The FederalReserved Rights Doctrine-From 1866 Through Eagle County, 8
NAT. RESOURCES LAWYER 221 (1975) (history of the reserved rights doctrine under which the
federal government claims a right to regulate water used within the states). The theory of Indian
reserved rights for water arose from the federal reserve rights doctrine established in Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), wherein the Supreme Court construed the treaty creating the
Fort Balknap reservation in Montana. The Court determined that with the withdrawal of land by
the federal government for the purpose of forming the Fort Balknap reservation, water rights to the
Milk River also had been "reserved" for the Indians for the purpose of agriculture on the reservation. Id. at 576-77. The reserved rights doctrine has acquired a broader base since Winters. In
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resource development and wealth for Indian tribes. Mineral leasing
practices of tribal lands are governed by the Indian Mineral Leasing Act
of May 11, 1938,177 which delegates authority to the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate the rules and regulations governing the implementation of the Act. The Secretary, as trustee, determines whether a
lease provides adequate financial return to the tribe. The tribes have no
authority, other than a controlled leasing power,17 8 to enter into agreements or control the development of their land for mineral leasing. In

general, since tribal technical expertise in the area of mineral developand
ment is relatively new, most tribes are dependent on federal expertise
179
private developers for production of tribal energy resources.

Concern for the environment in relation to mineral leasing is a new
factor in tribal consideration of energy resource exploitation. Until 1972,
the BIA had not considered the Environmental Protection Act (EPA)
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the Court held that when the federal government
withdraws its land from the public domain, it reserves appurtenant water-both surface and ground
water-by implication. Id. at 138. The water so reserved was unappropriated to the extent needed
to accomplish the purposes of the reservation of the water and vested on the date of reservation with
rights superior to future appropriators. Id. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and encompasses water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams. Id. The water rights of prior appropriators were unaffected and remained senior to federal reserved water rights. Id. at 140-41. However,
in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the Court limited the scope of federal water
reservation to the original purpose of the withdrawal of the land. Id. at 700, 715. The extent of the
doctrine remains undecided in many areas, such as the criteria for the amount of water reserved and
the extent of the needed use. Although early water reservations gave the federal government a
priority superior to many present users, the question of priority remains important in relation to
acquiring state permits or changing existing water rights. See, e.g., Marseille, Conflict Management:
Negotiating Indian Water Rights, WESTERN CONFERENCE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS/
LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY (1983).
177. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 (1938) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)-396(g) (1982)).
178. See id. (oil, gas and mineral leasing authorized for unallotted lands of various reservations).
Approval of the Secretary of Interior is necessary for such leases to assure that the Indian lessor
receives the highest possible rate of return, but such government approval using a standard of economic fairness may be counterproductive in terms of preservation of the tribal culture and the effects
of resource exploitation on the community. See, eg., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425
U.S. 649, 657 (1976) (the Northern Cheyenne preferred to avoid strip mining of coal reserves even
though that development of the land was more valuable economically than agricultural use).
179. For an evaluation of federal management of mineral royalties on Indian land, see COMMISSION ON FISCAL ACCOUNTABILrrY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 175, at 23767 (1982). The Commission examined the federal management of royalty collections on oil and gas
produced on federal and Indian lands, the allegations of underpayment of royalties due Indian landowners, and theft of oil from these lands. The Commission found the management system for royalties collection by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to be based primarily on an honor
system for the industry. The USGS does not verify the data reported by oil and gas companies. The
Survey's lease account records are unreliable for showing royalties owed, while late payment to the
government is common. Lessees' records are seldom audited and penalties for underpayment of
royalties seldom exist. Commission members recommended that internal controls for collection
management, site security, and enforcement be immediately implemented so that the Secretary of
Interior could enter into demonstration cooperative agreements with interested Indian tribes.
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applicable to Indian lands. However, subsequent regulations for the assessment of the environmental impact of mineral development on Indian
land have been challenged as inadequate, especially in regard to the effects of strip mining.'8 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 197711 now governs coal production on Indian lands and statutorily requires that a prior study with tribal participation determine the
regulation of coal development so that the development fulfills the purposes of the Act.
4.

State Powers

State law generally is not applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of an Indian tribe located within a state's boundaries unless Congress acts to give the state authority. The application of state civil laws
to non-Indians in Indian country in matters which do not affect Indians
or their property is not in conflict with any federal statute. The citizenship enactments for Indians have allowed Indians to participate in state
programs as citizens of the state of residence, and state laws can be applicable for participation in social services and other benefits regardless of
whether the Indian lives on a reservation or pays taxes. 182 Outside Indian country, tribes and individual Indians usually are subject to state
jurisdiction.
The federal purpose of reserving economic resources to tribes for
their self-support can affect lands outside of the reservation and preempt
state laws which regulate or tax Indians and/or their resources1 83 or
which grant competing private rights.18 4 The negative implications of
the Indian commerce clause, however, have been treated in a different
manner by the Supreme Court in recent years. Some commentators feel
180. See Anderson, Strip Mining on Reservation Lands: Protecting the Environment and the
Rights of IndianAllotment Owners, 35 MONT. L. REv. 209 (1974) (argues that regulations pursuant
to provisions of Indian mineral leasing statutes were grossly inadequate and failed to provide Indians
with any real protection).
181. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
182. See, eg., Acosta v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. App. 2d 421, 272 P.2d 92 (1954) (Indians
living on reservations are citizens and residents of the state, endowed with the same rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by all citizens and residents of the state); Piper v. Big Pine School
Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924) (Indian child eligible to attend public school although also
eligible to attend a federal school for Indians only).

183. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); see also White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (imposition of Arizona's use fuel and motor carrier
licensing taxes on a non-Indian logging company that operated solely on reservation lands harvesting timber for the tribe held invalid).

184. See Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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the doctrinal preemption analysis which provides protection for the authority of Indian governments over their reservations has been reworked
by the Burger Court, changing its operative sphere and maximizing the
reach of state authority. 8 '
Jurisdictional compacts between Indian tribes, states, and their subdivisions are desirable in instances where national laws do not meet local
needs. The legal authority of states to make binding agreements with
tribes without congressional consent is not clear. Public law 2801 186 does
allow general authorization for transfer of authority to the states where
approved by the Secretary of Interior upon consultation with the Attorney General of the United States. 1 87 Some state and tribal agreements
also have evolved from court cases involving tribal and state claims.
Such agreements may stipulate forbearance of the parties and require judicial enforcement.18 8
III.

RIGHTS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

A. Individual Rights as Limitations on Government Power
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard
the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of
the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united

by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.
185. See Clinton, supranote 139 (analysis of the most recent Supreme Court decisions, in light of
the traditional view of Worcester, particularly the Rehnquist opinions, which have sustained state
taxation of commerce with Indian tribes); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The Court in Confederated Tribes stated:
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force,
automatically bars all taxation of matters significantly touching the political and economic
interests of the Tribes. . . . That clause may have a more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian commerce.
Id. at 157.
186. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (1953) (codified as amended by Act of
April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79 (1968) in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322, 1323, 1360, 1324 (1982)).
187. See 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982) (retrocession of jurisdiction by state); Exec. Ord. No. 11,435,
33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (1968), reprintedin 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982) (Secretary of Interior is designated
to accept retrocession of jurisdiction by a state); see also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423,
428 (1971) (the Crow Indian tribe could not unilaterally vote to make state jurisdiction concurrent
with the reservation).
188. See, eg., Hearingson S. 2502 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong.
2d Sess. 15-16 (1978) (hearings considering the Tribal State Compact Act of 1978, which authorizes
states and Indians to enter into mutual agreements and compacts regarding jurisdiction and governmental operations on Indian lands, subject to Interior Department review and approval or revocation by either party); see also State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347-48 (Minn. 1977) (an agreement of
the Minnesota Chippewa tribe and the Minnesota governor to regulate fishing by non-Indians on the
Minnesota Chippewa reservation was subsequently adopted by the state legislature as law and upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court of Minnesota), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 919 (1978).
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There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by
creating a will in the community independent of the majority-that is,
of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so

many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary
or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security;
because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the
unjust views of the major as the rightful interests of the minor party,
and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method

will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst
all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society,
the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will
be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.' 9
The analysis of jurisdictional power and the inherent limitations of
national government found in states' rights and Indian tribal sovereignty
shift when the assumption is added that the promotion of individual liberty and freedom is the basic function of all government.190 The specific
guarantees of individual rights in the original Constitution are included
in three legislative prohibitions which have not been extensively litigated. 1 9 1 The first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights provide specific guarantees of individual rights in any form of governmental
action. 192 The passage of the fourteenth amendment did not make the
ten amendments of the Bill of Rights directly applicable to the states, and
the Supreme Court has incorporated only those provisions of the Bill of
Rights which it has determined are fundamental to the American system
of law and, therefore, applicable to the states. The Court has determined
that three of the individual guarantees of the first eight amendments are
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 335-36 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
190. See Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863
(1982); V. OSTROM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC (1971).
191. Article I, section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Amendment V provides the same prohibition for federal legislation in that "[n]o person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.
... Id. amend. V. The two ex post facto clauses in article 1, sections
9-10, "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed" and "[n]o State shall. . . pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law," act to prevent federal and state governments from punishing
persons for actions which were not illegal when they occurred. Id. art. 1, §§ 9-10. The third legislative prohibition is found in the same sections and includes the abolition of bills of attainder which
impose punishment on specific individuals.
192. Two amendments are not considered specific guarantees of individual rights. Amendment
IX provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." Id. amend. IX. Amendment X states: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the People." Id. amend. X.
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inapplicable to the states, 193 and two provisions of the Bill of Rights have
never been litigated to determine whether they are applicable to the
states.194 The constitutional protections of individual rights from governmental action which are relevant to the issues of energy sectionalism
are the due process guarantees governing governmental taking of individual property, 195 the privileges and immunities clauses 196 guaranteeing
certain privileges to citizens against state infringement, the contract
clause protecting individuals against retrospective legislation, and the
fourteenth amendment equal protection arguments providing against unequal classifications of individuals.
B. Due Process
The fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution provide
that neither federal nor state governmental action may deprive an indi-

vidual of private property without due process of law. 19 Incorporated in
193. The guarantee of amendment II that "[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed," id.
amend. II; the clause in amendment V which guarantees that "[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on the presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury" id. amend. V; and the amendment VII guarantee that "[i]n a suit at common law. . . the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved," id. amend. VII, are not applicable to the states. See J.
NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.YOUNG, supra note 27, at 455-56.
194. Amendment III that "[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law," id.
amend. III, and the provision of "excessive fine" in amendment VIII which states that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted;"
id. amend. VIII, have apparently never been litigated to determine whether they are applicable to the
states. The Court has never ruled on the latter provision in a specific case, but it appears to assume
its applicability in state cases. See, eg., Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
195. Amendment V provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Amendment XIV, section 1, states that "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " Id. amend.
XIV, § 1. The wording of the fifth amendment includes a clause requiring just compensation, which
is not included in nor incorporated into amendment XIV as a guarantee. However, the Supreme
Court has held that the due process guarantee in amendment XIV provides the same protection
against the state's taking of property without just compensation. See Chicago Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897). Amendment XIV also prohibits a state's
taking of property for private rather than public uses. See Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164
U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
196. Article IV, section 2 provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Amendment
XIV, section 1, states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States .... " Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
197. Traditional constitutional doctrine holds that the fourteenth amendment guarantees of protection from certain state laws or actions do not extend to violations by private individuals. See Civil
Rights Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supranote 27, at
415, 624. A challenge by a claimant requires some formal connection between the action of the
defendant individual and the state in causing the alleged harm. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Government employees of state, county, city, or local governments
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the fifth amendment is the guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Taken together, the fifth
and fourteenth amendments provide private individuals with substantive19 and procedural due process 9 9 protection for their property interare held to be acting for the state unless their actions are clearly outside the authorities provided by
their positions. See Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 136 (1964) (arrest by deputy sheriff of blacks
in private segregated park); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 627, 217 (1963) (statement of the Mayor
of New Orleans demanding cessation of sit-ins and prohibition by the police department). State
action will always comprise official acts such as legislation, executive orders, and court decrees. See
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 415, 624.
It should be noted that, generally, individual Indians have no rights or privileges attributed to
them as persons of Indian descent. Federal law protects individual property rights vis-a-vis those
rights of the tribe, which usually have been reserved by treaty in exchange for land cessions. Federal
law differentiates between rights of different tribes and rights of Indians and non-Indians, such as
imposing the burden of proof on white persons when an Indian demonstrates prior possession of
ownership in land claim cases and providing Indians employment preferences in BIA hiring.
198. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 425-96, for a discussion of substantive due process. Substantive review of legislation or governmental action by the
judiciary is concerned with the constitutionality of the underlying rule or action rather than the
fairness of the process by which government has applied the rule to an individual. The Supreme
Court primarily has used the common law doctrine of the implied powers suitable for state sovereignty-police power, eminent domain and taxing powers-when defining the boundaries of state
authority in connection with the preservation of due process rights of citizens. Over the years, the
Court made use of the constitutional theory of substantive due process, that is, the review of the
substance of congressional and state legislation, to determine the constitutional validity of governmental regulation and control of individual rights in relation to property interests.
From 1885 to 1900, the Court actively reviewed national and state legislation to determine
whether legislative branches had surpassed their authority by encroaching on individual economic
interests within the due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. While in fact
these decisions protected national and state encroachment on the existing business policies of laissez
faire, the judicial test required that legislation must bear some rational relation to a legitimate end of
government to be valid or the Court would view the substance of the legislation as a restriction of
economic liberty.
The change in this standard gradually occurred in a series of cases from 1905 through the
1930's. See, eg., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In the now famous "footnote 4" in
Carolene Products, Justice Stone speculated, in regard to the Court's tendency to focus on strict
scrutiny review to avoid deference to politics, that "legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Carolene Products,304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The footnote in Carolene provided the basis
on which the Court would subsequently distinguish general regulation legislation from government
restrictions on individual rights when giving independent review to state legislation. By Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court concluded that nothing in the Constitution or the judicial
function gave federal judges the authority to question the rationality of economic legislation. Id. at
730. The role of the Court, as stated by Justice Black, was to no longer sit as a "superlegislature" to
weigh the wisdom of the state legislature and its legislation. Id. at 731 (citing Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)).
The Court defers to and allows other branches of government great freedom in dealing with
issues of economic and social interests, but reserves strict review for legislation or action which is in
conflict with "fundamental" constitutional values. The concept of fundamental rights is difficult to
define and the exercise of the principle of their existence by the Court is questioned. The 17th and
18th century concepts of natural law values, which are viewed as essential to individual liberty, do
not appear in the text of the Constitution. However, the Court has held that a number of individual
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ests, including the right to just compensation whenever private property

is taken or destroyed by governmental action designed to further public
use.

The due process clause may invalidate retroactive legislation
although the constitutional clauses do not provide specific criteria for
such a violation." ° Legislation which regulates private property for the
public good is not constitutionally prohibited by due process.2 0 1 This
public good rationale provides the constitutional basis for state regulation of the entry and maximum rates of utilities providing service to the

public.
C.

20 2

Taking-Eminent Domain
Government taking 20 3 of property becomes an important issue of

fundamental rights do exist and can be implied from the Constitution. Among these rights is the
right to fairness in procedures concerning individual claims against governmental limitations on life,
liberty, or property. See A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177
(1970).
199. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, §§ 10-9 to 10-13, at 514-43, for a discussion of extending procedural due process beyond the personal interests of common law, and the Court's approach to what
process is due. Some have stressed that it is important to realize that procedural review of a law, in
order to determine its fairness, is limited in scope. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra
note 27, at 417. Due process guarantees only that a fair decision-making process take place before
the government takes some action which directly impairs a person's life, liberty, or property. Id.
Moreover, the law or rule to be enforced need not be a fair or just one. Id.
200. See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARV. L. REv. 692, 693-94 (1960). The fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses are
designed to cover retroactive legislation. The Court has treated four categories of such cases within
the constitutional prohibition, including cases that 1) involve emergency retroactive legislation, id. at
698-703; 2) challenge the constitutionality of curative statutes, id. at 703-06; 3) involve constitutional
issues of retrospective tax legislation, id. at 706-11; and 4) allege that retrospective general legislation
violates the Constitution. Id. at 693-97. The Court usually sustains retroactive emergency and
curative legislation. Id. at 698, 704. The Court will sustain retroactive taxing legislation when it is a
tax on income or a transfer tax which the taxpayer reasonably could expect would be a taxable
transfer. Id. at 706. Retroactive general legislation will be upheld if the law is rationally related to a
governmental purpose or affects a remedy rather than a right. Id. at 695.
201. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). The theory for all regulation for the public good
is based on the principle of common law incorporated in the fifth and fourteenth amendments that
rights of property created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process. Id. at 125.
When private property is devoted to public use, the owner, in effect, grants the public an interest in
the use, and that interest must be submitted to control by the public for the common good, but this
does not necessarily deprive the owner of his property without due process of law. Id. at 133-34.
The fourteenth amendment extended this principle of regulation and supervision of private property
for public good as a limit on authority of the states within their police power. Id. at 145-46.
202. See A. AMAN, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: THE REGULATORY DIALOGUE

§§ 3.01-.03 (1983).
203. The concept of "taking" should not be considered here as a literal government action, but
an expression of constitutional law for any publicly inflicted private injury for which the Constitution requires compensation. A taking occurs when the government controls a person's property so
that its value is lessened or destroyed. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 460. The term "person", for
purposes of interpreting the protection of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, can apply to private
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individual rights in energy-related matters whether the taking is indirect
because of loss of property value from government-inflicted damage or

regulatory constraints, or direct as a result of governmental use of the
right of eminent domain. Both physical damage by governmental entities

and regulatory constraints usually decrease property values; consider
nuisance laws, land use planning and zoning, public trust, reserved
rights, rights of way, and waste regulatory schemes. The taking of a per-

son's property interest in non-acquisitive governmental action, which
does not constitute physical appropriation, occurs when any branch of
the government impairs the use of private property by physical dam06
age, 2" destruction of market value, 201 or control of innocent use.220o6i
individuals, corporations, and aliens. No general rule exists which describes what constitutes a compensable taking. Originally, just compensation was awarded only when a taking of property was for
public purpose; otherwise, a taking was void. Id. at 458. Even today, it is only when a taking goes
"too far", measured generally in beliefs of expectation, that compensation is awarded. Id. at 459.
See Michelman, Property, Utility, andFairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof"Just Compensation"Law,80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). Michelman describes four factors which may determine whether a court will find compensation is constitutionally due:
(1) [Wjhether or not the public or its agents have physically used or occupied something
belonging to the claimant; (2) the size of the harm sustained by the claimant or the degree
to which his affected property has been devalued; (3) whether the claimant's loss is or is not
outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4) whether the claimant has sustained any
loss apart from restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity considered harmful to
other people.
Id. at 1184.
In general, the courts have consistently held that Indian property rights are protected under the
fifth amendment taking clause. See, eg., United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935).
Indian tribal property rights are fully enforceable and their loss should be compensated if they are
changed or extinguished. Claims litigation was authorized by Congress originally on a case-by-case
basis. The procedure since 1946 has been to give jurisdiction of tribal claims cases accruing prior to
1946 to the Indian & Claims Commission while the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over tribal
claims arising since 1946. See 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1982).
204. See, ag., Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922)
(government's regular firing of cannon over private property was held to be a compensable taking of
servitude); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1872) (flooding caused by the government which destroyed land was a compensable taking); see also L. TRIBE, supranote 5, § 9-3, at 45963 (discussion of the traditional tests for compensable takings). United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 261-62 (1946), and Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1914), represent the Court's approach in limiting damages for injury caused by the development of the railroad
and airplane to damages for the direct, peculiar, and substantial injury to the limited number of
readily ascertainable persons immediately near. Tribe suggests compensation may be extended as
technological advances make it possible to limit recovery costs by less artificial rules. L. TRIBE,
supra note 5, § 9-3, at 460 n.2.
205. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in which the Court held that an
uncompensated taking in excess of seventy-five percent of the property's value had occurred when
the state tried to enforce a statutory ban on coal-mining against the mining company that had sold
surface rights but had retained the right to damage the surface in a deed executed prior to enactment
of the mining ban. Id. at 413-14. But see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), in
which the Court permitted an expansive use of governmental power to regulate land use in holding
that a local zoning ordinance which prohibited mining excavation below the water table and required the refill of existing excavation below that level did not reduce the value of the lot in question
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon2 °7 provides the basis for the modem analysis of taking, that is, that taking is a matter of degree. If the
state police power diminishes the value of existing property rights too
severely, the exercise of the power becomes one of eminent domain for
which compensation is due to sustain the act.2 ° 8 In fact, the Court today
rarely holds that regulation constitutes a taking. Two situations may
qualify: (1) if all uses of property are prohibited by regulation; or (2) if a
right to use or burden property in a particular way is transferred from
the owner to another person or governmental entity.2 °9 Some commenin the case. Id. at 594. The Court saw no reason to decide how far regulation may go before it
becomes a taking. Id. The Court did state a two-part test to determine the validity of such governmental control of land use. First, it must appear that the interests of the public require such interference and, second, the means for accomplishing the purpose must be reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive on individuals. Id. at 594-95 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
206. Innocent use taking is the complete takeover of an owner's property justified by the owner's
insistence on using the property to injure other people or their property. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5,
at 461. In nuisance, or noxious use, offenders may be required to stop such use of the property or the
property may be seized, but government control of innocent use, or "non-noxious" use, has created
the most difficulties in compensable taking law. Id. Orders to desist or banishment by local zoning
ordinances have been upheld as uncompensable taking. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 411-12 (1914) (Court held that a brickyard, which had been far beyond the city limits of Los
Angeles when first built, could not be ordered to cease operations when the city's boundaries reached
it, without compensation from the city for the diminution in property value despite the finding that
the land was left unusable for any productive purpose by the restriction); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-90 (1926) (Court deferred to the zoning power for land use as a valid
use of police power regulation against due process and equal protection challenges). The Court still
continues this approach in zoning power cases based on the Court's conclusion that there is sufficient
public interest in the segregation of incompatible uses of land and that diminution of property values
is justified. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supranote 27, at 485-86. The government is
not free, however, to transfer property rights from one group of owners to another or to take and use
private property for the public good unless the action is justified by emergency conditions or compensation is paid. Id. at 488. The test stated in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962), is so broad that it essentially has eliminated the compensation restriction of the due process
clauses, and any possible limitation of the zoning power is left to state court determination. Id. at
486; see also supra note 205. But cf.Agins v. Tiburson, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) ("In assessing the
fairness of the zoning ordinances benefits occurring from governmental regulations must be considered along with any diminution in market value that landowners might suffer."). Although the
Court has not found zoning ordinances to constitute a taking in recent years, it retains its judicial
role in deciding whether a zoning regulation is so unreasonable that it constitutes taking.
207. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
208. Justice Brandeis contends in his dissent in Pennsylvania v. Mahon that any exercise of the
police power which protects the public from detriment and danger leaves no room for conferring
compensation on property owners under the concepts of reciprocity of advantage. Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Some commentators contend that the balancing of the concerns within Brandeis' dissent, i.e. whether to set limits on the arbitrary sacrifice of the private property owner for the
public good, becomes even more difficult in light of changing notions of the purposes of government
and what constitutes harm. See, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 5, §§ 9.3-9.4, at 462-465.
209. See, eg., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980); Nance v. EPA,
645 F.2d 701, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1981); Griffin v. United States, 537 F.2d 1130, 1139-40 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1976); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 679 (1st Cir. 1974). But see Loretto v.
Telepromoter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The Court in Loretto held that a
minor, but permanent, physical occupation of an owner's real property upon authorization of the
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tators feel these limitations provide a narrow reading of the taking clause
in light of the individual costs which regulatory programs may impose on

specific regulated bodies.210
In cases of direct physical appropriation of private property within
the power of eminent domain,2" the Court tends to decide the cases on

an ad hoc basis. It determines whether the taking has occurred, and, if
state government to permit a company to install cable television facilities on such property upon
payment of a one-time $1 fee was a taking of a portion of the owner's property without just compensation under the fifth amendment as made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 438.
Individual land owners also are limited in their abilities to affect zoning ordinance changes at
the local level with taking challenges. In State ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S.
116 (1928), the Court held that an ordinance which permitted land use variances upon the consent of
two-thirds of the surrounding property owners was in violation of due process because the property
owners could arbitrarily and capriciously withhold their consent. Id. at 121-22. However, in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), the Court determined that due process is not
violated if zoning requirement exemptions are granted only by general referendum. Id. at 679.
210. See Aman, Administrative Equity; An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982
DUKE L.J. 277.
211. The power of eminent domain is the power of sovereign government to take property for
public use without the owner's consent. P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. rev.
1980). Authorities in the law of eminent domain recognize the term "police power" to regulate land
and property use without the payment of compensation as distinct from the general state police
power and power to tax. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 480. The
power of eminent domain does not require constitutional provision, but jurisdictional limitations on
the power are stated in most state constitutions. Id. at 481. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress possesses the power of eminent domain as an inherent "attribute of sovereignty" and "the
offspring of political necessity." Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876). The power of eminent domain of a sovereign state extends to all real and
personal property interests, subject to the just compensation and due process requirements of the
fifth amendment. See P. NIcHoLS, supra note 211, §§ 2.1, 4.1, 8.1. Congress may take property
only "for public use," but that definition is within the discretion of Congress, unless the definition is
shown to involve an impossibility. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 49, 66 (1925).
The power has developed indifferent patterns in the state and federal governments of the United
States. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 481-82. Federal use of eminent
domain may be employed only if it is "necessary and proper" to effect one of the federal enumerated
powers within federal territory or land within the states. Id. at 481; see also Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367 (1876); P. NICHOLS, supra note 211, § 1.24. Although a state constitution may not
require that taking for public use must be compensated, the Supreme Court has held that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment requires that property be taken only for public use by a state
and that the owner be compensated for his loss. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City
of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The exercise of the power by the state will be valid as long as it
does not violate the United States Constitution. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra
note 27, at 481. The limitation on the state exercise of the power for public use taking has become
expansive as the exercise of due process within the police power of the state has expanded. The
narrow test that the states must provide the public the right to use or enjoy property taken was
broadened by the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Berman Court held
that the exercise of eminent domain to condemn blighted housing and then assemble a development
area for private redevelopment was an appropriate public use for exercise of the power. Id. at 33-34.
In the Berman decision, the Court reaffirmed the rule that once the legislature has determined the
purpose of a condemnation for public use is for the benefit of the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens, and thus within the state's police power, the role of the courts becomes very limited. Id. at
32.
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so, balances the equities in each particular case to see what compensation
is required. The Court does not view the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation as a limitation on the power of eminent domain but only as
a cost condition of its exercise.2 12 In determining the amount of compensation due an individual, the courts usually will look at the value of the
and potential uses
land at its "highest and best use," including present
2 13
which can be determined with reasonable certainty.
The exercise of eminent domain in energy sectionalism issues becomes important in the development of energy transportation systems
requiring rights of way across private property. The acquisition of a
right of way without the authority to exercise eminent domain from federal or state governments involves a number of problems for interstate
energy transportation pipelines. 2 14 Landowners might refuse to grant the
right of way for the construction of the pipeline or demand prohibitive
prices for the grant. If so, the pipeline constructor may seek a valid
statutory grant authorizing the acquisition of a right of way, for federal
or state eminent domain power permits condemnation proceedings that
allow construction to proceed within the requirements and restrictions of
the statutes. Citizen participation in public hearings may be a requirement of the grant of eminent domain or may be required prior to approval of a pipeline route by the appropriate state agency.
D. The Contract Clause
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social
compact and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former
are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the
State constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and
scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught
us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not
to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added
this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private
212. See Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689 (1897).
213. See P. NICHOLS, supra note 211, § 12.110.
214. See NATIONAL ENERGY LAW AND POL'Y INST., THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES

OF TRANSPORTING COAL BY SLURRY PIPELINE, EM 1-37 (1977) (discussion of grants of eminent
domain to pipelines based on the particular energy product to be transported and the specific
problems for acquiring rights of way for coal slurry pipelines without the authority of eminent domain); see also Tulsa World, supra note 25 (reports the effect of the defeat of the Coal Pipeline Act of
1983). Pipeline backers stated that the battle with individual railroads to obtain rights of way along
their lines, which the railroads refused, was too costly a process. Since purchasing a right of way
was not economically feasible, slurry pipelines could not be constructed without federal eminent
domain rights. Id.
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rights; and I am much deceived if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of
their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen
with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprizing and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too,
that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of
repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by
the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that
some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on
public measures, inspire a general prudence
and industry, and give a
2 15
regular course to the business of society.

The contract clause of article I, section 10216 of the Constitution was
envisioned as an explicit limitation on state governmental powers to enact retroactive legislation affecting contractual rights and obligations.
The clause originally was intended to prevent the states from enacting
debtor relief laws, but the Supreme Court has expanded the meaning of
the provision to invalidate state statutes which retrospectively impaired
the contractual obligations of persons or infringed on private property
rights. The Court also has applied the contract clause to restrict the
states' ability to modify or alter state public charters and contracts with
private parties.
The importance and use of the clause has waned over the years.2 17
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 279 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
216. Article I, section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall. . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
217. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.YOUNG, supra note 27, at 419-28. Under Chief Justice
Marshall, the Court used the clause to invalidate state statutes that retrospectively impaired almost
any contract obligation of private parties. Id. at 419. Impairments of contract by state legislation
were forbidden and invalidated by the Court as early as 1810. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 187 (1810). The clause came to be viewed as a substantial restraint upon states' dealings
with their own citizens and served to represent the sanctity of settled economic expectations in
American law. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 422. Almost one-half of
Supreme Court decisions before 1889 in which the Court invalidated state legislation were based on
the contract clause. Id. at 424. However, the three constitutional amendments enacted after the
Civil War changed the focus of the Court which then began to rely upon the doctrine of substantive
due process tc void state legislation that would infringe on property or business interests. Id. at 425.
During the 1930's, the Court held that state debtor relief laws, enacted to meet an emergency "societal interest" problem, were not violative of the contract clause unless major assets of debtors were
totally exempt from creditors' claims or remedies for claims did not protect creditors' rights. Id. at
426. By 1977, the Court had so frequently sustained state laws against challenges of the contract
clause that commentators speculated that its removal would not change the ability of the Constitution to check exercises of arbitrary state government power. Id. at 427 (citing E. CORWIN, TH
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 105 (H. Chose and C. Ducat rev. ed. 1973)).
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In 1977, however, in the case of United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,2 18
the Court invalidated a state law on contract clause grounds for the first

time in thirty years. Since that decision, the Court has somewhat enlarged the scope of the clause by interpreting it to reach a state act which
increased a private contractual agreement or obligation rather than
merely impairing or obligating existing contractual rights.21
Two Supreme Court cases have addressed contract clause challenges
relating to energy matters. In Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power and Light Co.,22 the Court held that a Kansas statute which im218. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). Bondholders of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey sought
a declaratory judgment that New Jersey's repeal of state legislation, which implemented an agreement of the two states to limit mass transit deficit operations which could be absolved or subsidized
by the Authority, violated the contract clause. Id. at 3. The state of New Jersey argued that repeal
was necessary since the energy crisis of 1973 and the air pollution problems of northern New Jersey
residents required further price increases for mass transit programs in the New York City metropolitan area. Id. at 13-14. The Court noted that the 1962 financial restrictions were valid since the state
had obligated itself in the contract and had not bargained away any of its police powers. Id. at 2527. However, while mass transit, energy conservation, and air quality were important goals, the
state could not refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligation to private creditors because it preferred to promote the public good. Id. at 28-29. Since alternative methods were available for such
goals, the repealing measure was unnecessary and unreasonable. Id. at 30-31. The opinion was
carefully narrow. The Court stated it would defer to legislative judgment when state legislation
affected private contractual agreements, id. at 22-23, and use special scrutiny only when the impairing legislation affected a state contractual obligation. Id. at 17. Furthermore, an obligation must be
financial in nature before the Court would review the reasonableness and necessity of the impairing
legislation. Id. at 24-25.
219. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). The Court held that a
Minnesota law for state pension reform, which required that companies terminating a pension plan
or closing their facility grant contractual pension benefits to company employees who had worked
for more than ten years, was in violation of the contract clause. Id. at 250. The impairment of
contract was held to be substantial because 1) the state law invaded an area never before subject to
state regulation; 2) the law was not a temporary emergency measure; and 3) the law was never
intended to remedy a general societal problem. Id. The dissent contended the decision expanded the
meaning and scope of the contract clause, especially in light of the remedial purpose of the law. Id.
at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent further contended that the contract clause was to be
read to reach legislation which impairs or abrogates contracts and cannot be read to reach legislative
enactments which increase existing contractual obligations. Id. at 255.
220. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). In Energy Reserves, the appellee-Kansas Power and Light Company
(KPL)-had entered into two intrastate contracts with the predecessor of Energy Reserves Group
(ERG) to purchase wellhead and residue gas with the contract to remain in effect for the life of the
field or the processing plants for the field. Id. at 403. Each contract contained two clauses: 1) a
governmental price escalator clause that the contract price would be increased if any governmental
authority fixed a price for natural gas higher than the existing contract price; and 2) a price redetermination clause which gave the producer the option to have the contract price redetermined no more
than once every two years by an averaging of prices paid by the purchaser under the other gas
contracts. Id. at 403-04. If the price was increased pursuant to either clause, each contract required
the public utility to seek approval from the Kansas regulatory commission to pass the increase
through to consumers. Id. at 404.
As authorized by the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), the Kansas legislature enacted a Natural Gas Price Protection Act in 1979, imposing price controls on the intrastate gas market with
regard to contracts executed before April, 1977. Id. at 407. The Kansas statute prohibited consideration "either of ceiling prices set by federal authorities or of prices paid in Kansas under other
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posed price controls on the intrastate gas market, as permitted within the
NGPA of 1978, did not impair existing gas contracts in violation of the
contract clause of the Constitution. 221 The Court declared that two inquiries are relevant in resolving the contract clause issue: (1) whether the
state law operates to substantially impair a contractual relationship; and
if so, (2) whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose in
the regulation.2 22 These inquiries guarantee that the state is within its
police power to legislate and is not providing a benefit for special interests when it enacts laws which affect prior contractual arrangements.2 2 3
The Court in Energy Reserves found it significant that the parties
were operating in a heavily regulated industry subject to extensive state
regulation in many areas, and that Congress had authorized the state to
regulate prices in this instance. 224 The Court held that the state had a
legitimate interest in limiting intrastate prices to the ceiling price set out
in the NGPA so that intrastate and interstate markets were balanced;
therefore, any impairment of contract was prompted by significant, legitimate state interests.2 2 5 Kansas had acted to protect consumers from
price escalation caused by deregulation, and the state reasonably could
find that higher gas prices had and would cause hardship for those persons who used gas heat and lived on limited incomes.22 6 The concurring
opinion pointed out that since the Court had determined that the producer's reasonable expectations had not been impaired, it was unnecessary to continue with the question of whether a contractual impairment
contracts in the application of governmental price escalator and price redetermination clauses." Id.
The Act did permit indefinite price escalator clauses to operate after March, 1977, in order to raise
the price of "old" intrastate gas to the NGPA section 109 ceiling price for categories of natural gas
not covered by other sections of the state act. Id. at 408.
The producer notified KPL in November, 1978, that gas prices would be escalated to the section
102 price for newly-produced gas under the NGPA, pursuant to the government price escalator
clauses in the contracts. Id. The public utility did not obtain pass-through authority and chose not
to pay the increased price, contending the escalator clauses in its contracts were not triggered by the
federal act and, later, that the Kansas statute also prohibited their activation. Id. The producer
sought a declaratory judgment in state court that it had a contractual right to terminate the contracts. Id. at 409.
The trial court entered summary judgment for the utility, holding that the NGPA set a ceiling
for contractual provisions, not a price, and the ceiling did not trigger the governmental price escalator clauses. Id. The trial court further noted that the Kansas act was not in violation of the contract
clause of the Constitution since the state had a legitimate interest in controlling serious economic
dislocations caused by a sudden increase in gas prices. Id.
221. Id. at 416.
222. Id. at 411-12.
223. Id. at 412.
224. Id. at 413.
225. Id. at 416-17.
226. Id. at 417.
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violated the Constitution.2 27
In Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,2 2 8 the Court held that an Alabama statute which increased the state severance tax of the gross value of oil and
gas at the point of production was not in violation of the contract clause
of the Constitution, even though statutory amendments to the enactment
excepted royalty owners from the legal duty to pay any of the increases
and prohibited producers from passing the increase through to consumers. 229 The Act was construed as merely prohibiting the state from looking to the royalty owners for payment of the additional taxes, and did not
prohibit producers from shifting the burden in whole or in part to royalty
owners.2 3 The Court determined that the contract in question appeared
to entitle the producers to recover a portion of the tax increase in proportion to the royalty owners' interests in the producers' proceeds in the sale
of oil or gas.23 1 Even if the statute were interpreted to entitle the producers to reimbursement from royalty owners for only that portion of the
severance taxes which the state law would impose on the royalty owners,
it still would be valid under the contract clause.2 32 However, the contracts in question imposed no obligation on the royalty owners to reimburse producers for a tax increase.2 33
The state prohibition against passing severance tax increases
through to consumers was held to restrict contractual obligations of
which the producers were beneficiaries.2 34 Sales contracts entered into
before enactment of the pass-through prohibition permitted producers to
include any increase in severance taxes in their prices.23 5 Yet, the Court
determined that the pass-through prohibition did not constitute a "Law
227. Id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
228. 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983). Producers of oil and gas sought a declaratory judgment that
amendments to an Alabama statute, which increased a severance tax on production, were in violation of the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution because they exempted royalty
owners from payment of a liability for the increase and prohibited producers from passing on the
increase to consumers. Id. at 2299. Producers claimed that pre-existing contracts provided for the
apportionment of severance taxes among producers, royalty owners, and non-working interests and
that pre-existing sales contracts required purchasers to reimburse producers for severance taxes paid.
Id. at 2300. The trial court concluded that both the royalty owner exemption and the pass-through
prohibition violated the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution, and that the passthrough prohibition was preempted by the NGPA of 1978. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the lower court. Id.
229. Id. at 2307-08.
230. Id. at 2304-05.
231. Id. at 2305.
232. Id. at 2304.
233. Id. at 2305.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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impairing the Obligations of Contracts" within the meaning of the contract clause and that the contract clause must "accommodate the inherent police power of the State 'to safeguard the vital interests of its
people.' -236 The Court stated that the pass-through prohibition was not
a rule limited in effect to contractual obligations but imposed a rule of
conduct to advance "a broad societal interest" and applied the rule to all
oil and gas producers, whether or not they were parties to sales contracts
which did permit pass-through. 37 The Court held that the effect of the
prohibition was incidental to the main effect of the statute to protect consumers from a tax increase and was subject to federal preemption insofar
as the prohibition applied to contracts for interstate sales of gas. 238
E. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The equal protection clause in the Constitution is found in the fourteenth amendment, section 1.239 Although the clause applies only to
state and local governments, so that only state statutes and local ordinances are tested under the clause, equal protection has become the most
important concept in the Constitution for protecting individual rights. If
the state or local government statutorily classifies persons to justify its
differing benefits or burdens as the means of achieving a statutory purpose, the classification may be tested under the fourteenth amendment
guarantee to determine if it is arbitrary. Racial, religious, or national
origin classifications are highly suspect under current equal protection
clause jurisprudence. A law which on its face creates no classifications
but, in effect, treats persons of like characteristics in different ways may
be viewed as if it established arbitrary classifications on its face. Similarly, a statute without a classification system but which in effect seems
to impose different requirements on identifiable groups of people that will
serve the legislative purpose of the enactment will be challenged as viola236. Id. at 2305 (1983) (citing Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct.
697, 704 (1983)).
237. Id. at 2306 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249 (1978)).
238. Id.
239. The fourteenth amendment, section 1, provides "nor [shall any State] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 1. The Supreme
Court has extended equal protection guarantees to federal actions through its reading of the fifth
amendment's due process clause. The standards for validity under the due process and equal protection clauses are the same. The difference in analysis of the guarantees relates only to whether or not
the government act classifies persons. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The argument that Indian law is anti-equalitarian and violates guarantees of equal protection has been raised
within this extension of fifth amendment guarantees. The Indian commerce clause, however, generally protects pro-Indian legislation from equal protection challenges. See Clinton, supra note 139, at
1009-18.
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tive of the equal protection clause. The numerous ways of measuring a
statute's impact, however, make a claim for strict judicial review difficult
to establish. In the determination of whether classifications exist within
legislation, the Court considers statistical proof to be relevant but not
determinative; additionally, state regulation or administrative rules will
not be overturned on the basis of such proof.
The relevance of equal protection rights in energy matters is illustrated by Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,2 ° in which oil and gas producers
claimed that the Alabama state severance tax statute was in violation of
not only the contract clause but also the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Court held that neither the statutory classification of
royalty owners for exemption from the legal duty to pay the state severance tax nor the classification of consumers for protection from producer
pass-through of the tax violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.24 1 The minimum rationality which the Court applies when considering equal protection challenges to state economic and commercial
regulatory statutes requires "some rationality in the nature of the class
singled out,"2 42 with rationality tested by the classification's reasonableness in relation to the purposes intended by the legislative or administrative rule. In Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, the Court declared that both
statutory classification measures met the standard of rationality and concluded that the state legislature could have reasonably determined that
the classification created by the royalty owner exception would encourage investment in oil and gas production.2 4 3 The Court also stated
that the pass-through prohibition bore a rational relationship to the
state's legitimate purpose of protecting consumers from excessive
prices. 244
Statutory classification measures can be anticipated in state statutes
and administrative rules which are concerned with environmental byproducts of energy production and generation, power export policies, distribution of the costs and benefits for new resource development, utility
rate structures for different rate classes, life-line rates for particular classifications of individuals, and the redistribution of unearned economic
rents which are available for capture from energy production. 245
240. 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2308 (1983); see also notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
242. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966) (state law requiring indigent convicts to
reimburse the state for certain costs of their trials held unconstitutional).
243. 103 S.Ct. at 2308.

244. Id.
245. See Tussing, The Regional Distribution of Energy-Resource Revenues, FISCAL AND POLIT-
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F. The Privilegesand Immunities Clauses
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that "the citizens of

each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." And if it be a just principle that every gov-

ernment ought to possess the means of executing its own provisionsby its
own authority it will follow that in order to the inviolable maintenance
of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of
the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all
cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or

its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision
against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction
should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different States and

their citizens and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will
never be likely246to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which
it is founded.

The Constitution contains two privileges and immunities clauses
which are intended to guarantee to citizens certain privileges against infringement by state government. The clauses prohibit the states from
classifying individuals as citizens or non-citizens for the purpose of treating them differently in the application of the laws, public benefits, and
public burdens, unless that difference of treatment is rationally related to
the status of state citizenship. The federal clause24 7 was intended to protect rights thought to be essential to all citizens within each state. The
use of the words "[c]itizens in the several States" in article IV is limited
to natural persons. This clause does not apply to artificial persons and
persons who are only residents of the state and not citizens. 4 8 The fourteenth amendment clause 4 9 bars states from imposing regulations which
ICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE WESTERN STATES 7 (1983), for a listing of state legislative roadblocks to
redistribution of unearned economic rents. Tussing lists the data which do not exist and which are
needed for rational consideration of redistribution of energy-resource rents. The data and estimates
which are lacking include: 1) identification of the total value of domestically-produced oil and gas,
coal, and uranium which is "unearned" economic rent available for capture by landowners, governments, and other nonproducing interests; 2) the origin of the rent by state and region; 3) the actual
division of rent among the various levels of government and other claimants; 4) the impact of the
1970's energy price upheavals on the total economic rent generated in energy production, and the
division of that rent; 5) the influence of federal legislation such as crude oil price controls, NGPA,
and the Windfall Profits Tax on the magnitude and division of rent; and 6) the probable effect of
falling oil prices on total rent, and the relative position of all parties.
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
247. Article IV provides "[tihe Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cI. 1.
248. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) (the term "citizens" does not apply
to legislatively-created artificial persons such as corporations).
249. The fourteenth amendment states "nlo State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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deny nonresidents the advantages resulting from state citizenship. The
clause pertains not only to natural persons but also to corporations and
aliens; therefore, the fourteenth amendment clause applies to a broader
range of discriminations against noncitizens than does the article IV
clause.25 o
Although only the article IV clause is invoked in the areas of fish,
game, and natural resources, and for constitutional challenges to state

and local taxation, it may be useful in only a limited sense for resolving
the interestate energy problems which arise from state protectionalism. 25 1 For example, one line of cases holds that preferred access by
state citizens may be protected and are justified because of citizens' interest in local resources and support through taxes. 2 52 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has determined more narrowly that the article IV clause
protects only those basic individual interests which outweigh a state's
253
purpose and bear upon the vitality of the nation as a single entity.
Under the modem view of the privileges and immunities clauses, the

Court probably would hold that a state may conserve natural resources
or exploit them, but that neither policy can be formed with enactments
Court distinctions for the two clauses have turned on the changing concept of federalism and the
early argument that the fourteenth amendment was only to protect the rights of newly freed slaves.
See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Only one case has found that a state has
violated rights peculiar to federal citizenship, and it was subsequently overruled. See Colgate v.
Harney, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940); see also J. NoWvAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, at 414.
250. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-33, at 412.
251. See Lutz, supra note 6, at 614. See also Hiecklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The Court
in Hicklin invalidated the Alaska Hire Act under the article IV privileges and immunities clause. Id.
at 526. The state law gave across the board employment preference to Alaska residents over nonresidents for work on all oil and gas leases and other such agreements to which the state was a party in
order to alleviate the unemployment problem for untrained Eskimos and Indians. Id. at 520. The
Court noted that prior cases had held such state discrimination against nonresidents seeking to pursue a trade, occupation, or common calling within the state to be in violation of the clause. Id. at
526. This particular statute for hiring preference could not withstand similar scrutiny because it was
not crafted in a way to aid its intended Eskimo and Indian beneficiaries when the Act simply granted
all Alaskans a flat employment preference for all jobs covered by the Act. Id. at 527. While
Alaska's ownership of the oil and gas resources was a factor in judging the law, state ownership did
not justify pervasive discrimination. Id. at 528-29.
252. See, eg, Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364 (1902). But see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948) (state statute,
which required nonresidents to pay a fee for a commercial license which was 100 times greater than
that paid by residents, was invalid as discriminatory against noncitizens), reh'gdenied, 335 U.S. 837
(1948).
253. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (Montana
licensing system of hunting elk which required nonresidents to pay more than seven times what
residents were charged was valid because elk hunting was a recreation and sport distinguishable
from a right of citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause).
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which discriminate against out-of-state citizens or residents. 25 4 While the

use of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may be
more adequate than the privileges and immunities clauses for safeguarding these rights, the clauses have the potential for providing an affirmative source for new personal rights which might not otherwise be
protected.2 55
IV.

CONCLUSION

The difficulty encountered when determining the influence of sec-

tionalism on the legal issues of energy production and consumption in
the United States is in properly identifying the legal issues from among

many others. Sectionalism is the expression of social, economic, and
political differences along geographic lines. In the United States, the sections-in general, the greater northeast, south, and west-are not homo-

geneous, socioeconomic units of states, but highly complex entities of
diverse states and local governments which tend to share common political interests in the same social and economic ends.2 56
The American legal system, on the other hand, is the structure of a

cohesive order of norms which seeks to govern within concepts of our
federal ideology, the separation of powers, and formal justice.2" 7 The
analysis of such a legal structure is complex. For our purposes, the anal-

ysis has involved the order of norms which exist in relation to the jurisdictional powers of the fifty individual states, of the Indian tribal
governing bodies, and of the federal government, along with individual
rights in relation to energy production and consumption. The scope and

extent of settled expectations within the cooperative federalism which exists today among the competing, and yet cooperative, sovereigns cannot
254. See, eg., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979) ("ownership" of wild game was
a fiction which should not be used as a justification for discrimination in interstate commerce against
out of state residents).
255. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 988, 1147. Congress may protect the privileges or immunities of national citizenship by regulating private conduct, while the fourteenth amendment grants
courts the power to protect such rights only from state action. Id. at 1147 n. I.
256. See generally D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 84-124
(2d ed. 1972). Elazar states that the political arrangements of sectionalism serve as the means to a
common end and have grown so sufficiently permanent that they persist despite conflicts or differences which may arise among the states of the section over time. For example, the intrasectional
conflict of the far western states over water resources does not affect their common concern for
problems such as education and commerce. Cooperative efforts created within each section are now
so institutionalized that a confederation of states can be maintained within a section to resolve common problems politically. This sectional bond gives the states within each section a unique relationship to national politics because of specific political issues of sectional importance.
257. See W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 16-21 (5th ed. 1967).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/1

70

Dodson: Jurisdictional Powers of Governments and Individual Rights in Ene

1985]

ENERGY REGULATION JURISDICTION

be accurately described or measured. 258 Each state will still respond individually to cooperative federalism in spite of its political ties to sectionalism. 259 Who gets what, when, and how, relative to energy production
and consumption in the United States, and the nature of justice in doing
so will occur within the framework of formal jurisdictional powers and

individual rights, not sectional political arrangements.
258. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 847. Fischer explains:
The decision to vest certain decisionmaking responsibilities in Washington, as opposed to
the state capital was basically the result of historical accident rather than conscious design.
In securing the "more perfect union" there were some inevitable tradeoffs. One such tradeoff was the decision to share decisionmaking responsibility between state and federal government. As a compromise, the decision was less than perfect, perhaps less than logical,
but it did have one value-it worked. Consequently, when called upon to examine the
basis of that compromise, the Court should understandably be reluctant to tinker with
something that seems to work even though it may not understand why or how it works.
Id. at 846-47.
259. See Elazar, supra note 256, at 84, 93. Elazar claims that understanding the responses of
states requires an appreciation of two sets of relationships: (I) the way in which states functioning as
political systems influence the operations of the general government; and (2) the way in which the
states-still functioning as political systems-adapt national programs to meet their own needs and
interests. He suggests that while sectionalism is a major source of geographical variations that influence state-to-state differences in responding to nationwide developments, two other factors interact
with sectionalism at the same time and shape the individual states' political responses. These include
the political culture of the United States and the concept of the continuing frontier-the continuing
effort of Americans to extend control over their environment and reorganize their settlement patterns because of the impact of this idea.
Elazar further notes that three major political subcultures reflect American ideas about the
marketplace and the governing of individuals, which he describes as representing individualistic,
moralistic, and traditionalistic values. The migration and present location of the subcultures can be
identified and traced by geographic section and the territorial lines of states. Elazar hypothesizes
that it is necessary to know (1) the particular characteristics and processes of political culture and
sectionalism, (2) their relationship to the idea of a continuing frontier and its processes, and (3) how
all three of these factors relate to the varying responses of the states to the cooperative federal system
in order to conceptually organize the complex phenomena of American society and politics.
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